scholarly journals Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 190 (5) ◽  
pp. 787-808 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich ◽  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
Prior Belief

Philosophy’s rematch: A new conceptualization of the study of higher education

2021 ◽  
pp. 147402222110029
Author(s):  
Gabe A Orona
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Education Research ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
Higher Education Research ◽  
Field Of Study ◽  
Research Philosophy ◽  
Development Of Students

In recent decades, philosophy has been identified as a general approach to enhance the maturity of higher education as a field of study by enriching theory and method. In this article, I offer a new set of philosophical recommendations to spur the disciplinary development of higher education, departing from previous work in several meaningful ways. Due to their deep and useful connections to higher education research, philosophy of measurement, virtue epistemology, and Bayesian epistemology are introduced and discussed in relation to their conceptual association and potential practical influence on the study of higher education. The culmination of these points signals a learnercentered lens focused on the development of students.

scholarly journals Epistemology without guidance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Normative Epistemology

AbstractEpistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

Scientific Reasoning in Young Children: Preschoolers’ Ability to Evaluate Covariation Evidence

2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Koerber ◽  
Beate Sodian ◽  
Claudia Thoermer ◽  
Ulrike Nett
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
Scientific Reasoning ◽  
Causal Beliefs ◽  
Prior Belief ◽  
Reasoning Abilities ◽  
Evidence Evaluation ◽  
Basic Understanding

Preschool children’s basic scientific reasoning abilities were investigated in two experiments. Consistent with findings by Ruffman et al. (1993) , Experiment 1 showed that even 4-year-olds can evaluate patterns of covariation evidence. However, even 6-year-olds had difficulties interpreting non-covariation evidence. Experiment 2 showed that 5-year-olds could overcome this difficulty when prompted to expect no causal relationship between two variables. Experiment 2 further showed that preschoolers’ evidence evaluation skills were affected by their pre-existing causal beliefs. However, their performance was above chance even when the evidence contradicted a prior belief they held with some conviction. In sum, our results demonstrate a basic understanding of the hypothesis-evidence relationship in preschool children, thus contributing to a revision of the picture of the scientifically illiterate preschooler.

scholarly journals Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1065-1098
Author(s):  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
Giacomo Lanzani ◽  
Philipp Strack
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Prior Belief ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Initial Belief ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Limit Points

We study how an agent learns from endogenous data when their prior belief is misspecified. We show that only uniform Berk–Nash equilibria can be long‐run outcomes, and that all uniformly strict Berk–Nash equilibria have an arbitrarily high probability of being the long‐run outcome for some initial beliefs. When the agent believes the outcome distribution is exogenous, every uniformly strict Berk–Nash equilibrium has positive probability of being the long‐run outcome for any initial belief. We generalize these results to settings where the agent observes a signal before acting.

scholarly journals The Role of Frontal Cortical and Medial-Temporal Lobe Brain Areas in Learning a Bayesian Prior Belief on Reversals

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (33) ◽  
pp. 11751-11760 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony I. Jang ◽  
Vincent D. Costa ◽  
Peter H. Rudebeck ◽  
Yogita Chudasama ◽  
Elisabeth A. Murray ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Lobe ◽  
Medial Temporal Lobe ◽  
Prior Belief ◽  
Brain Areas ◽  
Bayesian Prior
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document