scholarly journals Regulating monopoly price discrimination

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Cowan
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Monopoly Price

scholarly journals Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding

2016 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 141-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Belleflamme ◽  
Wouter Vergote
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Monopoly Price ◽  
Hidden Cost

scholarly journals Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñaki Aguirre ◽  
Simon G. Cowan
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Constant Elasticity ◽  
Monopoly Price

scholarly journals Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1601-1615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñaki Aguirre ◽  
Simon Cowan ◽  
John Vickers
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
General Analysis ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Monopoly Price ◽  
Inverse Demand

This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions—involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets—are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output. (JEL D42)

scholarly journals The Limits of Price Discrimination

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (3) ◽  
pp. 921-957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Benjamin Brooks ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Prior Distribution ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Total Surplus ◽  
Monopoly Price ◽  
Producer Surplus ◽  
Welfare Consequences

We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out “third degree price discrimination.” We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer sur plus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade. (JEL D42, D83, L12)

Monopoly, price discrimination, and rent-seeking

Public Choice ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nava Kahana ◽  
Eliakim Katz
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Monopoly Price
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