Undermining truthmaker theory

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 192 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Perrine
Keyword(s):  
Ratio ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 276-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Rychter
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Hetherington

Pode o conhecimento de uma dada verdade admitir gradações? Sim, de fato, segundo o gradualismo deste artigo. O artigo introduz o conceito do saber-como que p – isto é, o conceito de saber como é que p. Saber-como que p é claramente gradual – admitindo gradações, dado que se pode saber mais ou menos como é que p. E a vinculação que este artigo faz entre sabercomo que p e saber que p revela que este último tipo de conhecimento também é gradual (mesmo que disfarçadamente). A teoria dos criadores-deverdade [truthmakers] é, então, invocada para enriquecer a análise, e a análise é aplicada às tarefas de fazer sentido do fundacionismo e de barrar uma certa forma de ceticismo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Conhecimento. Gradualismo. Absolutismo. Ceticismo. Fundacionismo, Criadores-de-verdade. BSTRACT Can knowledge of a particular truth admit of degrees? Indeed so, according to this paper’s gradualism. The paper introduces the concept of how-knowledge that p – that is, the concept of knowing how it is that p. Howknowledge that p is clearly gradational – admitting of degrees, as one can know more or less of how it is that p. And this paper’s linking of how-knowledge that p with knowledge that p reveals the latter kind of knowledge, too, to be gradational (even if covertly so). Truthmaker theory is then called upon to enrich the analysis, and the analysis is applied to the tasks of understanding foundationalism and of thwarting one form of scepticism. KEY WORDS – Knowledge. Gradualism. Absolutism. Scepticism. Foundationalism. Truthmakers.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 80 (5) ◽  
pp. 923-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Baron
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 460-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jago

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-293
Author(s):  
Jamin Asay

Many philosophers think that truthmaker theory offers a correspondence theory of truth. Despite the similarities, however, this identification cannot be correct. Truthmaker theory offers no theory of truth, nor can it be employed to offer an acceptable substantive theory of truth. Instead, truthmaker theory takes truth for granted. Though truthmaker theory is not a correspondence theory, it shares with it the same motivational basis—that truth is worldly—and accounts for what is pre-theoretically compelling about correspondence theories. As a result, those at all attracted to correspondence theory (including many deflationists) should reject it and accept truthmaker theory instead.


Noûs ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 178-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross P. Cameron
Keyword(s):  

Ratio ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad Vance

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Naoaki Kitamura
Keyword(s):  

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