scholarly journals How Extreme Is the Precautionary Principle?

NanoEthics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-257
Author(s):  
Sven Ove Hansson

AbstractThe precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle is explicated with the help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-497
Author(s):  
Sophia PAULINI

This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides, in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle, the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the pesticide in question. However, the CJEU’s substantive analysis of the compatibility of the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEU’s judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or application.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 197-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Blake

In May 2018, the European Union (EU) banned all outdoor uses of three neonicotinoid insecticides due to concerns about adverse effects on pollinators following their use. Neonicotinoids continue to be used in other areas of the world such as North America. However, increasing scrutiny following the European Union decision threatens their availability as a control tool for farmers in these regions too. This article aims to provide an update on the current status of neonicotinoids, including a brief overview of the reasons behind the European regulatory decision, alternative control strategies that are available to farmers, how the situation in Europe might influence what will happen in other regions of the world, and what this means for future regulatory decision-making. The author concludes that the recent neonicotinoid ban in the EU represents an overly conservative approach to pesticide regulation, and in using the Draft Bee Guidance Document, one where the majority of pesticides currently on the market will fail. There is no definitive scientific evidence that neonicotinoids are the primary cause of declines in bees, and although banning these insecticides is the factor that humans have the greatest control over, it represents an overly simplistic solution to a very complex problem, and one that alone may not improve bee health. Whilst extreme pressure from environmental NGOs and politicians have undoubtedly helped shape these decisions, it is imperative that the regulatory process allows scientific innovation to help achieve food security and protect the environment. Ruling against recent lawsuits brought by Syngenta and Bayer CropScience to contest the bans on their respective neonicotinoids, the General Court of the European Union, said that the EU's"precautionary principle" meant that the EU could take measures if there was scientific uncertainty about risks to human health or the environment. The precautionary principle lies at the heart of EU regulation and effectively puts the burden of proof to demonstrate that a pesticide poses no unacceptable risk onto the manufacturers. Given that neonicotinoids are insecticides, and insecticides kill insects, it is not difficult to connect how the use of the precautionary principle led to the neonicotinoid ban. However, this principle is at odds with the desire to innovate – the so-called "Innovation principle" – "whenever policy or regulatory decisions are under consideration the impact on innovation as a driver for jobs and growth should be assessed and addressed". The innovation principle and precautionary principle should be complementary, recognising the need to protect society and the environment while also protecting the EU's ability to innovate. Neonicotinoids represent one such innovation where their highly targeted nature, especially as seed treatments, makes them effective within Integrated Pest Management (IPM) strategies, in comparison to alternatives such as pyrethroids, organophosphates and carbamates, that are known to be highly toxic to bees (and other non-target invertebrates) through spray drift. Replacing neonicotinoids with these products will also result in higher overall environmental risks, including risks to taxonomic groups that are not adversely affected by neonicotinoids such as birds, mammals and fish, together with higher risks to humans, particularly applicators. The HFFA report recommends that potential environmental concerns must be balanced against the need to boost agricultural productivity, and if such an assessment results in societal benefits outweighing the costs, then the technology should be applied. The hope is that regulators in other regions of the world will judiciously balance innovation and precaution, and base decisions on science rather than opinion or fear, and thus allow the continued use of neonicotinoids as vital tools in the global fight against crop pests.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-98
Author(s):  
Rogier Kegge ◽  
Annemarie Drahmann

This article aims to assess whether a programmatic approach could still be a useful legal instrument for the allocation of scarce environmental rights and a legitimate tool for implementing EU Directives. In response to the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) in the Dutch Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen case, 1 we will examine under what conditions a programmatic approach could be compatible with the precautionary principle and the freedom to conduct a business as protected by EU law. These principles are inextricably linked, and the Member States and the cjeu must find a balance between a high level of environmental protection and the freedom to conduct a business.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Alemanno

Once more, while facing an analogous risk phenomenon affecting their predominantly homogeneous societal and economic interests, the two sides of the Atlantic seem to adopt diverging stances. Amid the publication of several new studies and a set of EFSA scientific opinions linking the use of the world's most widely used pesticides to bee decline, the European Union adopted a temporary ban on their use. While the Commission does not expressly rely on it, its restrictive decision is clearly based on the controversial precautionary principle. Yet, as it is discussed in this article, the conformity of this decision with the requirements that determine the legal invocation of this principle remains doubtful.


2005 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
Richard N. Cooper ◽  
Gary E. Marchant ◽  
Kenneth L. Mossman

elni Review ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 2-6
Author(s):  
Ludwig Krämer

The question, whether or not plants that were obtained by genome editing are covered by Directive 2001/181 is at present the subject of proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In this case, Advocate General (AG) Bobek has just issued his Opinion. He concluded that such plants are exempted from the provisions of the Directive, as genome editing is a form of mutagenesis, so that the exemption of Art. 3(1) of the Directive, read in conjunction with its Annex I B, applied. The application of the precautionary principle does not lead, in his opinion, to a different result. The Opinion of the AG is not binding for the CJEU. However, it has a considerable weight, as it is the first factual and legal analysis of the case made by someone else than one of the Parties, and as the AG is an eminent lawyer with a rich professional experience and who is in rank equal to a judge at the CJEU. This contribution argues that the Opinion of the AG comes to conclusions which are contrary to the wording and the purpose of Directive 2001/18, and that genome editing must be understood as being covered by the provisions of that Directive.


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