Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-332
Author(s):  
Shijie Huang ◽  
Peng Yi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Potential Games ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

scholarly journals On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 2734-2767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Swenson ◽  
Ryan Murray ◽  
Soummya Kar
Keyword(s):  
Potential Games ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

scholarly journals Distributed best response dynamics with high playing rates in potential games

2019 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 40-59
Author(s):  
Stéphane Durand ◽  
Federica Garin ◽  
Bruno Gaujal
Keyword(s):  
Potential Games ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

Strategic Interaction Among Content Providers in Sponsored Content Markets

2020 ◽  
pp. 157-177
Author(s):  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mostafa Jourhmane
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
End Users ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Content Provider ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

The data-sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the network subscription fees for end-users. As sponsored data gains traction in the industry, it is important to understand its implications. This work considers content providers (CP) choice of how much content to sponsor and the implications for end-users and CPs. In particular, the authors model the interactions of CPs as a non-cooperative game in terms of pricing, the credibility of content, and the amount of sponsored content. Additionally, they have proved through a detailed analysis of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the game properties, they implement a learning scheme using best-response dynamics that allows CPs to learn their strategies in a fast, accurate, yet completely distributed fashion. Extensive simulations provide attractive insights on how the sponsoring content may increase the CPs payoff.

A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
ULRICH BERGER
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Generalized Model ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Asymmetric Conflicts ◽  
Zero Sum

We present a generalized model of myopic best response adaptation in large populations. In asymmetric conflicts, individuals can be in the role of the row player or the column player. The idea that an individual's role need not be fixed is introduced explicitly in our model by a process of role switching. The best response dynamics, the symmetrized best response dynamics, and the continuous time fictitious play process are included as special cases. We show that the set of Nash equilibria is attracting for zero-sum games. Moreover, for any base game, convergence to a Nash equilibrium implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.

scholarly journals Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk–dove game

2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 61-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Ismael Martínez-Martínez
Keyword(s):  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response
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