A theory of social programs, legitimacy, and citizen cooperation with the state

Aid and social programs are commonly used to fight insurgencies. However, sometimes they fail to achieve their goal of increasing citizen cooperation with the state. I propose a series of game-theoretic models that focus on the strategic interaction between a state and a citizen in the face of a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power by an insurgency. I argue that even if the provision of aid or social programs increases citizens’ intrinsic motivation to cooperate with the state, it does not necessarily translate into more cooperation. I show that citizen cooperation depends on whether the increase in the provision of aid is accompanied by an increase in the use of violent or hard tools by the state, the citizens’ expectation of future rewards, and the insurgency’s response. The models thus provide a rationale for why even if social programs increase state legitimacy, they may fail to increase citizen cooperation.

Strategic interaction: Distrust and cooperation in US-China relations

<p>International cooperation is generally thought to be made possible, or at least enhanced, by a relationship of trust between nations. This proposition is examined with a particular focus on US-China relations, and proceeds through a critique of various models of cooperation that works to expose the limits imposed by the assumption of a causal relationship between trust and cooperation. A concept of strategic interaction is developed on the basis of analysis of values and interests, asymmetric exchange and distrust, and is offered as an alternative to grand strategic narratives for understanding the strategic behaviour of states.</p>

Strategic interaction: Distrust and cooperation in US-China relations

<p>International cooperation is generally thought to be made possible, or at least enhanced, by a relationship of trust between nations. This proposition is examined with a particular focus on US-China relations, and proceeds through a critique of various models of cooperation that works to expose the limits imposed by the assumption of a causal relationship between trust and cooperation. A concept of strategic interaction is developed on the basis of analysis of values and interests, asymmetric exchange and distrust, and is offered as an alternative to grand strategic narratives for understanding the strategic behaviour of states.</p>

Timing of social feedback shapes observational learning in strategic interaction

Many types of social interaction require the ability to anticipate others' behavior, which is commonly referred to as strategic sophistication. In this context, observational learning can represent a decisive tool for behavioral adaptation. However, little is known on whether and when individuals learn from observation in interactive settings. In the current study, 321 participants played one-shot interactive games and, at a given time along the experiment, they could observe the choices of an overtly efficient player. This social feedback could be provided before or after the participant’s choice in each game. Results reveal that players with a sufficient level of strategic skills increased their level of sophistication only when the social feedback was provided after their choices, whereas they relied on blind imitation when they received feedback before their decision. Conversely, less sophisticated players did not increase their level of sophistication, regardless of the type of social feedback. Our findings disclose the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors modulating observational learning in strategic interaction.

Dynamic tax competition between symmetric countries with multiple strategic investors

Two symmetric countries compete over two-period under a non-preferential taxation regime to attract multiple investors where investors are strategic and investments are sunk once invested. Contrary to the existing results, we find that tax holidays do not arise during the initial period. Equilibria in mixed strategies arise in both periods where competing countries set strictly positive tax rates during the initial period. Strategic interaction between large investors reduces competition and increases tax rates during the initial period. We provide full characterization and uniqueness of equilibria in mixed strategies.JEL classification: F21, H21, H25, H87

A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for a number of different competitive scenarios. The results show that there exist threshold levels of advertising effectiveness at which duopoly behaviour bifurcates, that perfectly cooperative advertising can lead to competitive disadvantage, and that perfectly predatory advertising can lead to stagnation or losses.