Payment and provision consequentiality in voluntary contribution mechanism: separate or joint effects?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-36
Author(s):  
Jie He ◽  
Jérôme Dupras ◽  
Franck Ndefo ◽  
Thomas Poder
Keyword(s):  
Joint Effects ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

scholarly journals Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-279
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Arianna Galliera ◽  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

AbstractWe focus on ways and means of solidarity and their more or less voluntary and involuntary character. Alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by combining redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM, with an outside option for a “super-rich”, R, participant to donate to VCM participants. The outsider may discriminate between participants of the VCM on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her. Inclusion in and exclusion from the VCM are involuntary while contributions in it are voluntary. How involuntary inclusion of R in VCM affects her discriminatory voluntary donations and contribution behavior is explored experimentally.

Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism

1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Tatsuyoshi Saijo ◽  
Yoshikatsu Tatamitani
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

scholarly journals Collective action for watershed management: field experiments in Colombia and Kenya

2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN CAMILO CARDENAS ◽  
LUZ ANGELA RODRIGUEZ ◽  
NANCY JOHNSON
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Watershed Management ◽  
Water Use ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Social Loss ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Voluntary Contribution

ABSTRACTThe collective action problem around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of appropriation and the asymmetries in access. We report the results of two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The irrigation game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented by a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia than in Kenya. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.

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