Trust and Envy: the Political Economy of Business Groups in Developing Countries

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel H. Leff ◽  
Rachael Behr ◽  
Jeffry Frieden ◽  
Shelby Grossman
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
The Political

Re-Thinking the Role of Institutions in Neoliberalism From New Institutional Economics Perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Ilke Civelekoglu ◽  
Basak Ozoral
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Fertile Ground

In an attempt to discuss neoliberalism with a reference to new institutional economics, this chapter problematizes the role of formal institutions in the neoliberal age by focusing on a specific type of formal institution, namely property rights in developing countries. New institutional economics (NIE) argues that secure property rights are important as they guarantee investments and thus, promote economic growth. This chapter discusses why the protection of property rights is weak and ineffective in certain developing countries despite their endorsement of neoliberalism by shedding light on the link between the institutional structure of the state and neoliberalism in the developing world. With the political economy perspective, the chapter aims to build a bridge between NIE and political economy, and thereby providing fertile ground for the advancement of NIE.

After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico

1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Neoliberal Reforms ◽  
Market Governance ◽  
Neoliberal Policies ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
New Institutions

Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces, can result in new institutions for market governance. By vacating institutionalized policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger two-step reregulation processes, as first, political entrepreneurs launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets, and second, societal groups respond to these projects by mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Depending on the strengths and strategies of politicians and societal groups, reregulation processes result in varied institutions for market governance. The article develops this argument by analyzing how neoliberal reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Mexico highlight the importance of moving beyond the questions of why developing countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them. Students of the political economy of development should shift their attention instead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.

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