The Incoherence of Institutional Reform: Decentralization as a Structural Solution to Immediate Political Needs

Institutional reforms are structural changes in the rules and norms of authority, with effects that are long-term and unpredictable on government, politics, and society. But leaders may undertake them to solve unrelated, discrete, short-term political problems. Understanding the latter is key to understanding the characteristics of many real reforms, and hence their fate. We introduce the concept of instrumental incoherence and use it to construct a theory of decentralization where reform is motivated by orthogonal objectives. We show that reformers’ incentives map onto the specifics of reform design via their side effects, not their main effects, which in turn lead to the medium- and long-term consequences eventually realized. We characterize downwardly accountable decentralization, which ties the hands of the center to empower local voters, vs. upwardly accountable decentralization, which ties the hands of local government to empower the center. We use these ideas to explain highly divergent outcomes in two extreme cases, Bolivia and Pakistan, using detailed, original evidence. Our analysis likely extends to a broader class of reforms where the incentives of agents pursuing a change, and the effects of that change, are highly asymmetric in time and dimension.

Upgrading Big Brother: Local Strategic Adaptation in China’s Security Industry

What are the circumstances under which latecomer firms can develop indigenous innovative capacity and compete globally? China’s construction of a vast domestic security apparatus has contributed to it becoming the world’s largest supplier and consumer of video surveillance products and services. It has also produced several globally competitive companies, including those engaged in digital surveillance. Although security equipment producers initially emerged in Guangdong province, China’s leading technology companies are concentrated in Zhejiang province. This comparative study is motivated by the puzzle of why Guangdong, which has a larger security equipment industry with more local investment and earlier introduction of foreign technology, has lagged behind Zhejiang in technological upgrading. We trace this provincial variation to the policy choices of local state bureaucracies and the business strategies of local enterprises. While macro-level variables such as market demand and establishing national industry standards are important for industrial development, this study demonstrates the critical role of local technocrats and entrepreneurs in facilitating technological innovation in a rapidly evolving surveillance regime. Our analysis also reveals how latecomers to a technology-intensive industry were able to adapt their products strategically to meet the technical demands of a major segment of the domestic market, China’s public security sector.

Defense Sector Politics

Ownership and control of defense industrial firms affords the military power, autonomy, and a claim to economic rents. Why do some countries succeed at shifting some or all such firms from military to civilian ownership and control, while others do not? I argue that differing configurations of relative civilian and military coalitional and institutional strength contribute to outcomes. Civilian and military must find party and executive-branch allies who can compete for them to craft or defeat legislation affecting their interests, but coalition building alone is insufficient. Actors must also cultivate executive bureaucratic institutions able to design and implement policies promoting their interests. How coalitions and institutions form, ossify, or fail to develop is assessed through a comparative study of Chile, Argentina (1983–1989), and Argentina (1989–1997).

Donor-Funded Women’s Empowerment in Tajikistan: Trajectories of Women’s NGOs and Changing Attitudes to the International Agenda

This article investigates internationally funded women’s empowerment initiatives in Tajikistan. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent Tajik civil war (1992–1997), this newly independent, Muslim-majority country has experienced an influx of foreign aid, including in the field of women’s rights. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, the article analyzes the growth and diversification of local, Western-funded women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) between 1991 and 2020, paying attention to their leadership and aims, as well as changing perceptions of donors’ interventions. It is argued that, initially, local activists were supportive of international projects, which promoted gender equality by supporting women’s integration into the new, capitalist economy. In the last decade, however, an increasing conditionality of funding and deteriorating donor-NGO relations has fueled local contestations of the international agenda. The donor-enhanced women’s empowerment model, which fosters individual responsibility and self-reliance, is increasingly criticized for aggravating the conditions of local women in the context of a growing economic insecurity characterizing the local capitalist economy. Against this resentment, an alternative women’s empowerment model, advancing gender equity based on complementarity of male and female social roles and stressing the importance of family as a safety net against economic precarity, is gaining prominence locally.