scholarly journals Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust?

Author(s):  
Mara Bollard
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annika Karinen ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Reinout E. de Vries

A broad literature indicates that pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivity relate to, among other things, political attitudes, moral condemnation, and symptoms of psychopathology. As such, instruments measuring disgust sensitivity have been widely used across subfields of psychology. Yet, surprisingly little work has examined whether self-reports in disgust sensitivity reflect systematic trait variation. Here, we present the first study to examine self-other agreement in pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivity. Romantic partners (n1 = 290), friends (n2 = 212) and acquaintances (n3 = 140) rated each other on these three domains of disgust sensitivity and on the HEXACO personality dimensions. Correlations between dyad partners’ self- and other-ratings were calculated to estimate the magnitude of self-other agreement. We found self-other agreement in all domains of disgust sensitivity (r’s of .36, .46, and .66 for moral, pathogen, and sexual disgust sensitivity, respectively), with this agreement only slightly inferred from personality perceptions (percentages mediated by HEXACO were 15%, 7%, and 33% for pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivity, respectively). These results suggest that pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivity reflect systematic trait variation that is detectable by others and distinct from broader personality traits.


Author(s):  
Mathias Clasen

The most effective monsters of horror fiction mirror ancestral dangers to exploit evolved fears. For most of human evolutionary history, we have faced threats in the domains of predation, conspecific violence, contagion, status loss, and dangerous nonliving environmental features. We thus very easily acquire fears directed toward threats from these domains. This chapter argues that the nonrandom distribution of human fears is reflected in horror, which features stimuli that mirror evolved fears, often in incarnations that are exaggerated and/or counterintuitive for increased salience, including giant spiders, supernormal monsters such as evil clowns, and physics-violating ghosts. Many monsters are also equipped with contagion cues, thus exploiting an evolved disgust mechanism. Some monsters evoke moral disgust through their violation of norms. To strengthen audiences’ emotional responses to such monsters, horror artists often provide descriptions of characters’ reactions which are mirrored by the audience through an adaptive mechanism enabling emotional contagion.


PsyCh Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qionghua He ◽  
Yanhui Xiang ◽  
Xia Dong ◽  
Jiaxu Zhao

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9(5)) ◽  
pp. 636-658
Author(s):  
Heather Conway ◽  
John Stannard

Though much has been written about judicial anger and other emotional displays from the judicial bench, comparatively little attention has been paid to disgust. This particular emotion does not seem to be expressed or reflected by judges as much as other negative sentiments or feelings; “disgust” also has an emotional resonance that we might not associate with things like anger and sadness, and exists in more than one form. Focusing on a sample of cases in which judges have used the term, the article questions what type of disgust is being shown (“core” disgust or “socio-moral” disgust), whether the emotion is experienced or articulated, and what the significance is of using the word “disgust” in the judicial narrative. Si bien mucho se ha escrito sobre la ira judicial y otras manifestaciones de emoción por parte de la judicatura, se ha prestado relativamente poca atención a la repugnancia. Parece que los jueces no suelen expresar o reflejar dicha emoción tan a menudo como otros sentimientos negativos; la “repugnancia” también tiene un eco emocional que, posiblemente, no relacionamos con la ira y la tristeza, y existe en varias formas. Centrándonos en una muestra de casos en los que los jueces han utilizado el término, en el artículo cuestionamos qué tipo de repugnancia se está mostrando (repugnancia “básica” o repugnancia “socio-moral”), si la emoción está siendo experimentada o articulada, y cuál es el significado del uso de la palabra “repugnancia” en la narrativa judicial.


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