A Cost-Sharing Scheme for the k-Level Facility Location Game with Penalties

Author(s):  
Feng-Min Wang ◽  
Jia-Jia Wang ◽  
Na Li ◽  
Yan-Jun Jiang ◽  
Shi-Cheng Li
2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1325-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaidi Li ◽  
Yu Li ◽  
Jia Shu ◽  
Dachuan Xu

2020 ◽  
Vol 148 ◽  
pp. 106710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Ding ◽  
Wenjing Liu ◽  
Xin Chen ◽  
Qizhi Fang ◽  
Qingqin Nong

Author(s):  
Minming Li ◽  
Pinyan Lu ◽  
Yuhao Yao ◽  
Jialin Zhang

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2+1 to a ratio of 2.75.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dachuan Xu ◽  
Donglei Du

2014 ◽  
Vol 239 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Harks ◽  
Philipp von Falkenhausen

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