Mechanism Design for One-Facility Location Game with Obnoxious Effects

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2+1 to a ratio of 2.75.

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Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations

Combinatorial Optimization and Applications - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-64843-5_30 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 440-452

Author(s):

Zhongzheng Tang ◽

Chenhao Wang ◽

Mengqi Zhang ◽

Yingchao Zhao

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Facility Location ◽

Location Games

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Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.24963/ijcai.2021/596 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Hau Chan ◽

Aris Filos-Ratsikas ◽

Bo Li ◽

Minming Li ◽

Chenhao Wang

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Facility Location ◽

Private Information ◽

Practical Importance ◽

Future Research ◽

Facility Location Problems ◽

Social Objective ◽

Comprehensive Survey ◽

Strategic Agents ◽

High Level

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decade, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to select a number of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting all the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

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