Attributes needed for Japan’s central bank digital currency

: A game between a representative household and a government was analyzed. The household chose which fractions of two currencies to hold, e.g., a national currency such as a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and a global currency such as Bitcoin or Facebook’s Diem, and chose the tax evasion probability for each currency. The government chose, for each currency, the probability of detecting and prosecuting tax evasion, the tax rate, and the penalty factor imposed on the household when tax evasion was successfully detected and prosecuted. The household′s fraction of the national currency, the government’s monitoring probability of the national currency, and the penalty factor imposed on the global currency, increased in the household′s Cobb Douglas output elasticity for the national currency. The household′s probabilities of tax evasion on both currencies increased in the government’s Cobb Douglas output elasticity for the national currency. The government’s taxation on both currencies decreased in the output elasticity for the national currency. High output elasticity for the national currency eventually induced the government to tax that currency more than the global currency. The household′s probability of tax evasion on the global currency increased in the government’s output elasticity for that currency. The household was less (more) likely to tax evade on the national (global) currency if the government valued taxation and penalty on the national (global) currency. The results are illustrated numerically where each of the eight parameter values were varied relative to a benchmark.

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Central bank digital currency: the future of institutional changes in the banking sector

Fìnansi Ukraïni ◽

10.33763/finukr2021.02.026 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 (2) ◽

pp. 26-48

Author(s):

Volodymyr MISHCHENKO ◽

◽

Svitlana NAUMENKOVA ◽

Svitlana MISHCHENKO ◽

◽

...

Keyword(s):

Central Bank ◽

Financial Stability ◽

Banking Sector ◽

Central Banks ◽

Credit System ◽

Bank Supervision ◽

Bank Of China ◽

Digital Currency ◽

Financial Monitoring ◽

The Impact

The purpose of the article is to reveal the essence and features of the introduction of digital currency of central banks and their impact on the conditions of monetary policy, financial stability, as well as institutional transformations in the development of national banking systems. The study is based on an analysis of projects of issuance and use of digital currencies of the ECB and central banks of leading countries, as well as the results of pilot projects of the National Bank of China on the use of the digital yuan and NBU on the e-hryvnia circulation. It is proved that digital currency of the central bank should be considered as a new dematerialized form of national currency in addition to cash and non-cash forms. Particular attention is paid to the study of the impact of the use of digital currency by central banks on the main parameters of economic policy. The main directions of potential influence of digital currency use on transformation of mechanisms of realization of monetary, budgetary and tax, macroprudential policy, maintenance of financial stability, activization of action of channels of the monetary transmission mechanism, and also on reforming of system of the state financial monitoring and bank supervision are substantiated. It is determined that one of the consequences of the use of digital currency will be the ability to ensure full control over all monetary transactions, which will help reduce the shadow economy and corruption. Structural and logical schemes of centralized and decentralized models of issuance and circulation of digital currency of central bank have been developed, directions of changes in the structure and functions of commercial and central banks, as well as in the structure of the financial and credit system in general have been substantiated.

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