Determinants, principles and perspectives of cooperation between the polish fi nancial supervision authority and the police in economic security and prevention of economic crime — a quest for synergies

The Polish Financial Supervision Authority (hereinafter: KNF) is the key element of the economic security system of the Polish State. By establishing the KNF, the Polish legislator applied the concept of integratedfi nancial supervision (covering bank supervision, insurance supervision and capital market supervision) located outside the central bank. The KNF has been vested with a broad mandate, including powers to supervise authorised entities. However, the scope and nature of measures available to the KNF in the prevention of economic crime are determined by the institutional position of the KNF, which has not been established as a law enforcement authority or a uniformed or special service but rather an institution engaged in the fi ght against economic crime by providing expertise, supporting other state services specialised in this area. The KNF and the Offi ce of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (hereinafter: UKNF) actively support, among others, the police units that fi ght crime in the fi nancial market and work to increase the economic security of the Polish State. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure broad and effi cient cooperation between the police and the KNF. However, such collaboration must not be limited to relations between the institutions’ management; it should also involve, as far as possible, working and operational activities carried out at both institutions by individuals responsible for day-to-day tasks. This paper provides a closer perspective on the formal and organisational framework of said cooperation and discusses its examples.

European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism

This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-supervised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected in bank disclosure practices.

Ethical Identity Index and Financial Performance of Islamic Banks in Asia

This study is a follow-up study conducted by Zaki et al. (2014), who explored Islamic banks' ethical identity with financial performance. This study aims to identify the identity of Islamic banks in Asia against Shari'ah law and examine the relationship between EII and financial performance. The data used are financial data from 7 Islamic banks in Asia in 2016-2019. The study results show that the higher the EII value, the higher the Islamic bank supervision of sharia. Then the researcher describes the relationship between EII and financial performance as measured by using Return On Assets. The result is that there is no relationship between EII and financial performance.

Theoretical Investigation for the Failure of Lehman Brothers and Merril Lynch: A Lesson for Banking Institutions in Nigeria

The study theoretically examines the failure of Lehman Brothers and Merril Lynch as a lesson for the banking institutions in Nigeria. Hence, the instability experience in the Nigeria financial system in recent time; especially, banking sub-sector was as a result of institutional failure. Banking experts in Nigeria viewed that the failure of the two banks was an enough signal to the Nigerian banking industry. Hence, the study reveals that the two banks were absolutely limited to the size and age in determining their future instead of depending on the effectiveness and efficient management of risky assets. Hence, the conventional lending procedures are not instituted; rather than depending on subprime mortgage arrangement that has no collateral securities. The declining home prices has make refinancing more difficult as a result of inadequate innovations in securitization. The recommends that the regulatory authorities should not only relied on the conventional tools of bank supervision, but, they should employ more non-conventional methods of obtaining classified information. The financial institutions should train and retrain their employees to meet the current reality on ground. The conventional lending procedures should be instituted rather than depending on subprime mortgage management that did not have collateral securities. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should be proactive to ensure effective supervision and risk management principles.

Central bank digital currency: the future of institutional changes in the banking sector

The purpose of the article is to reveal the essence and features of the introduction of digital currency of central banks and their impact on the conditions of monetary policy, financial stability, as well as institutional transformations in the development of national banking systems. The study is based on an analysis of projects of issuance and use of digital currencies of the ECB and central banks of leading countries, as well as the results of pilot projects of the National Bank of China on the use of the digital yuan and NBU on the e-hryvnia circulation. It is proved that digital currency of the central bank should be considered as a new dematerialized form of national currency in addition to cash and non-cash forms. Particular attention is paid to the study of the impact of the use of digital currency by central banks on the main parameters of economic policy. The main directions of potential influence of digital currency use on transformation of mechanisms of realization of monetary, budgetary and tax, macroprudential policy, maintenance of financial stability, activization of action of channels of the monetary transmission mechanism, and also on reforming of system of the state financial monitoring and bank supervision are substantiated. It is determined that one of the consequences of the use of digital currency will be the ability to ensure full control over all monetary transactions, which will help reduce the shadow economy and corruption. Structural and logical schemes of centralized and decentralized models of issuance and circulation of digital currency of central bank have been developed, directions of changes in the structure and functions of commercial and central banks, as well as in the structure of the financial and credit system in general have been substantiated.

Financial Stability and Bank Supervision in the Twenty-First Century

This chapter addresses the challenges and opportunities for financial stability and bank supervision in the twenty-first century. It is argued that one of the major challenges to the vision of achieving a world where the financial systems are stable, reliable, and accessible was the 2008 global financial crisis. The G20 took up an agenda to improve regulation and supervision regimes globally through initiatives such as higher capital requirements and new liquidity regulations. However, challenges have emerged due to advances in technology, financial innovations, climate change, legislative or regulatory barriers and money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. In particular, supervisors in developing economies face the challenge of how to ensure financial stability while at the same time promoting the development of the financial system to sustainable economic growth for poverty reduction and greater equality.

The Logic and Legitimacy of Bank Supervision: The Case of the Bank Holiday of 1933

The U.S. banking holiday of March 1933 was a pivotal event in twentieth-century political and economic history. After closing the nation's banks for nine days, the administration of newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt restarted the banking system as the first step toward national recovery from the global Great Depression. In the conventional narrative, the holiday succeeded because Roosevelt used his political talents to restore public confidence in the nation's banks. However, such accounts say virtually nothing about what happened during the holiday itself. We reinterpret the banking crises of the 1930s and the 1933 holiday through the lens of bank supervision, the continuous oversight of commercial banks by government officials. Through the 1930s banking crises, federal supervisors identified troubled banks but could not act to close them. Roosevelt empowered supervisors to act decisively during the holiday. By closing some banks, supervisors made credible Roosevelt's claims that banks that reopened were sound. Thus, the union of FDR's political skills with the technical judgment of bank supervisors was the key to solving the banking crisis. Neither could stand alone, and both together were the vital precondition for further economic reforms—including devaluing the dollar—and, with them, Roosevelt's New Deal.