Corporate taxation, incumbency advantage and entry

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (9) ◽  
pp. 1817-1828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elie Appelbaum ◽  
Eliakim Katz
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Taxation ◽  
Incumbency Advantage

Oiling the Wheels of Multi-Party Politics in Africa: How Power Alternation Affects Party Financing in Ghana

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 666-682
Author(s):  
Joseph Oti Frimpong
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Party Funding ◽  
Opposition Parties

Supplementing literature study with in-depth unstructured interviews from the two dominant political parties in Ghana on how they mobilize funds, the key argument of this article is that the loss of a presidential election in Ghana is a reduction in a party’s major income streams. Unlike other studies that look at incumbency advantage in party funding from the angle of governments’ policies that weaken the opposition parties, this article analyses incumbency from their sources of funds. It fulfils two major objectives of identifying the sources of funds of political parties and establishing the link between these sources and incumbency.

How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Hall ◽  
James M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Us Senate ◽  
State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

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