Non-competitive Elections at the Local Level and the Incumbency Advantage of Mayors – Research Experiences from Poland

The objective of this paper is an attempt to answer if non-competitive elections to commune councils in Poland may be the result of incumbency advantage of mayors. The author assumes, that the effects of incumbency advantage of mayors in influence not only the competition for the office of mayor, but also the entire local political scene. These effects may weaken the competitiveness of elections and lead to the cartelisation of local political scenes. In extreme cases, it may even cause the degeneration of political pluralism and lead to non-competitive elections at both the executive and legislative levels. The paper analyses relationships between the competitiveness of elections at the local level and the incumbency advantage effect as exemplified by a group of small communes with up to 20,000 inhabitants and presents the findings of the conducted research in the form of case studies of 18 localities representing six regions of Poland.

Taming the Incumbency Advantage: Innovative Constitutional Designs from the "South"

This Discussion Paper was drafted for an International IDEA webinar on Taming the Incumbency Advantage (25 May 2021), the first of a series on innovative constitutional design options. It has been revised and updated to reflect contributions from webinar participants: Professor Juvence F. Ramasy (Madagascar), Professor Ridwanul Hoque (Bangladesh) and Professor Gabriel Negretto (Latin America), among others. The webinar series seeks to identify, discuss, profile and showcase the ‘hidden treasures’ of innovative constitutional/institutional design options—including from the Global ‘South’—with potential to help tackle emerging and recurrent challenges facing societies around the world. The goal is not to promote any specific institutional design, but rather to enrich conversations about constitutional reform processes and share comparative constitutional law and practice insights among academic and practitioners’ communities.

The Winning Party Platform: Voter Perceptions of Party Positions and Voting in Urban Africa

Previous literature suggests that some African parties employ non-valence positional issues in their party platforms and that this practice is more prevalent in some countries than in others; however, no quantitative research has analysed the electoral effects of non-valenced campaigns. How do African voters perceive parties’ policy positions? Who uses party platforms to choose candidates? Using data from an original survey experiment conducted in Nairobi, we examine voter perceptions of party platforms and their behaviour in the 2017 Kenyan presidential elections. We find that the opposition party’s clearer messaging helps average voters recognise and characterise the party, compared to the incumbent’s moderate policy stance. Moreover, while both parties’ policy positions positively affect voting, non-partisan voters are more likely to support a candidate advocating moderate policies. This implies an incumbency advantage: incumbents’ broad-appeal strategies help maximise their votes, whereas opposition parties have limited strategy options.

Pennsylvania in 2018: How Redistricting Does and Doesn’t Make a Difference

In this Field Note, we use precinct- and individual-level data on Pennsylvania to assess whether congressional redistricting influenced voter preferences in the 2018 midterm. Despite redistricting vastly altering the distribution of voters in House districts, this did little to change their preferences. Rather, redistricting contributed to Democratic House gains primarily by configuring a handful of districts to be more favorable to the Democratic Party. The evidence for minimal direct effects of redistricting on voter preferences, despite the presence of national political conditions breaking strongly in favor of Democrats, speaks to the increasing nationalization of American elections and with it, a concomitant decline in the incumbency advantage.

(Sympathy for) the Devil You Know: Openness, Psychological Entropy, and the Case of the Incumbency Advantage

Why do some individuals prefer lesser-known, riskier experiences over more well-known options in life? In this paper, we focus on the case of the electoral advantage to incumbency, and the role that psychological entropy reduction can play in undermining that advantage among individuals who lack simplifying heuristics, such as party brand loyalty. We build on recent work in political psychology, applying a more general political psychology framework linking the Big Five personality trait of Openness to a compulsion to gather and process information. Using data from the 2014 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, we find more Open respondents are more willing to vote for more uncertain House challengers at higher rates, but only among Independent respondents who are unable to rely on partisan cues to simplify the psychological entropy presented by such challengers. This suggests Openness captures relative preferences for encountering and reducing psychological entropy rather than traditionally defined risk preferences.