Analisis pengaruh makroekonomi terhadap dana pihak ketiga (DPK) dengan equivalent rate (ER) sebagai variabel intervening

This study aims to determine the Effect of Macroeconomics on Third-Party Funding (TPF) with the Equivalent Rate (ER) as the Intervening Variable (Case Study of Islamic Commercial Banks Period 2016-2020). This type of research is quantitative research which utilizes secondary data in the form of time-series data. Purposive sampling was used as the sampling method. The data that has been obtained later processed using the E-views version 9 application tool. Based on the results, it is shown that the Inflation, BI Rate, and Equivalent Ratevariables partially have a negative effect on TPF, while the Exchange Rate has a positive effect on TPF. Moreover, the variables of Inflation, Exchange Rate, and BI Rate have a positive and significant effect on the Equivalent Rate (ER). It is also found thatThe Equivalent Rate variable cannot mediate the effect of Inflation, Exchange Rate, and BI Rate on TPF.

¿No hay nada oculto bajo el sol? El financiamiento de terceros en arbitraje y las obligaciones de revelación bajo el ordenamiento jurídico del Ecuador

El financiamiento de terceros (FPT) o también conocido como Third Party Funding es una figura que ha ganado un espacio importante en el arbitraje internacional en la última década. Esencialmente, el FPT implica que un tercero, ajeno al proceso, decide financiar a una de las partes, en todo o en parte, los costos y gastos relacionados con el arbitraje a cambio de un beneficio económico. Si bien el FPT no es un mecanismo nuevo en Estados Unidos o Europa para garantizar el acceso a la justicia, en América Latina ha aumentado su popularidad en los últimos años y, cada vez más, resulta común encontrarse con arbitrajes en los que participa un financista. En el Ecuador, esta figura aún resulta extraña y novedosa para muchos. Además, la Ley de Arbitraje y Mediación no hace referencia a los financistas en arbitraje ni a las obligaciones de las partes que reciben financiamiento de terceros. Sin embargo, con el incremento de arbitrajes en los que una de las partes cuenta con el respaldo de un financista vale preguntarse: ¿Tienen las partes la obligación de revelar su situación frente a los árbitros? ¿Existe alguna obligación legal de revelación bajo el ordenamiento jurídico ecuatoriano? Este artículo explora la figura del financiamiento de terceros en arbitraje y las obligaciones de revelación bajo las leyes domésticas.

The Grassroots and Party Funding in Nigeria: Trajectories for Money Politics

This paper addresses grassroots indifference to party funding in Nigeria. It argues that all existing explanations on political apathy do not address the escalating tendency of the ordinary but educated and politically aware Nigerians to be averse to party funding. Drawing on political culture theory, the paper attributes the current trajectory of the phenomenon to a form of "inverse participant" culture by the grassroots, consequent upon their alienation that is driven by a convergence of three key variables: the cartel nature of party formation which is responsible for the disconnect in state-society relations, the appropriation and weaponisation of parties through funding, and decades of unfulfilled campaign promises. It further contends that grassroots indifference creates a funding vacuum which gives room for the monopoly of the party by the wealthy few and the moneybags. The paper concludes that, to arrest grassroots disinterest in party funding, it will require a reform of the Nigerian state to wean it of predatory and exclusionary character and arrest the prevailing cartelization of party formation and appropriation of political parties. It is also important to evolve a political culture that will create positive civic consciousness so as to shape voter-party-candidates relations in order to arrest the current negative voter attitudes that expect and demand for money from party candidates. This paper adopted the qualitative method of research , making use of extant literature on the subject matter and in addition used the interview method in seeking the opinions of a few individuals, some of them party card carrying members.

Delays Expected but Duration of Delays Unpredictable: Causes, Types, and Symptoms of Procedural Applications in Investment Arbitration

Delays are becoming a common phenomenon in international investment arbitration and challenging the conventional belief that it is a time-effective mode of dispute resolution. These delays, majorly stemming from interim procedural applications, are known to arise due to the different interests and types of stakeholders involved in the process. This article provides an empirical analysis of such arbitration proceedings to cull out the types, nature, and effects of delay tactics in such proceedings. This article identifies three types of applications that play an increasing role in investment arbitration, namely, applications for ‘security for costs’, applications for disclosure of third-party funding, and the objections of manifest lack of legal merit of claims. Such delays can particularly become a cause of concern for investment arbitration as they have impacts beyond those which are on the parties involved.

Third-party funding: The effect of the growing third-party funding industry in international arbitration on New Zealand

<p>The quickly rising trend of third-party funding in international arbitration is an extremely novel and complex challenge for the international arbitration community. Third-party funding has a long history in the law of litigation funding but this new trend will require the international arbitration community to grapple with this concept in a new setting. As domestic countries have taken hugely varying approaches to third-party funding in a litigation context, the international arbitration community has a wealth of choice available to it in deciding how to approach this trend. There are many outstanding issues in this area and there is much speculation as to how these issues will be resolved. New Zealand will be affected by the choices that the international arbitration community makes in this regard when New Zealand engages in international arbitration. The possibility of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) coming into force is also likely to exacerbate some of the effects of the choices made on the state of New Zealand in investor-state arbitration.</p>

Third-party funding: The effect of the growing third-party funding industry in international arbitration on New Zealand

<p>The quickly rising trend of third-party funding in international arbitration is an extremely novel and complex challenge for the international arbitration community. Third-party funding has a long history in the law of litigation funding but this new trend will require the international arbitration community to grapple with this concept in a new setting. As domestic countries have taken hugely varying approaches to third-party funding in a litigation context, the international arbitration community has a wealth of choice available to it in deciding how to approach this trend. There are many outstanding issues in this area and there is much speculation as to how these issues will be resolved. New Zealand will be affected by the choices that the international arbitration community makes in this regard when New Zealand engages in international arbitration. The possibility of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) coming into force is also likely to exacerbate some of the effects of the choices made on the state of New Zealand in investor-state arbitration.</p>

Requirements for Becoming an Adjunct Professor in Medicine: A Comparative Analysis of the Regulations of German Medical Faculties

Background: Following a medical habilitation or equivalent qualification after continuous scientific activity, one can apply for a position as an adjunct professor (außerplanmäßige Professur). The medical faculties in Germany have issued regulations for these appointments. The aim of this paper was to compare the requirements for appointment as an adjunct professor among medical faculties. Methods: The currently valid regulations of medical faculties in Germany were analyzed for the target criteria of publication performance, teaching performance, possibility of shortening the procedure; consideration of appointment for junior professor, patents, acquisition of third-party funding, medical didactic qualifications, and/or special scientific achievements; and review procedure. Results: An analysis of 38 currently valid regulations showed large differences between the requirements. The number of required first/senior authorships differs significantly within the regulations (from 4 to 16). The median of the required number of first/senior authorships is six (Q1 = 5, Q3 = 7). In total, 93% (n = 35) of the universities provide information on the publication medium or the value of the publication. Third-party funding is desired or required in 68% (n = 26) of the regulations. There are also clear differences in the scope of required teaching activities, which range from two to a maximum of six years of teaching. Shortening the time to apply for an adjunct professorship is possible in 45% (n = 17) of the cases. In total, 97% (n = 37) of the faculties provide information on external review, with 71% (n = 27) most frequently requesting one or two external reviews. Conclusion: The regulations show clear differences among individual requirements for adjunct professorship. Standardization would be desirable and would lead to comparable conditions and therefore also to a fair recognition of scientific achievements.

How human capital, universities of excellence, third party funding, mobility and gender explain productivity in German political science

Using a unique panel dataset of virtually all German academic political scientists, we show that researchers become much more productive due to the accumulation of human capital and third party funding. We also show however, that while universities of excellence have more productive researchers, individuals who go there do not become more productive. Finally, we show how women publish only 9 percent less than men with the same level of prior publication experience, but are about 26 percent less productive over their entire career, as early productivity leads to later productivity, so that women increasingly fall behind. These results cannot be explained through the influence of childbearing. Rather, they support the ‘theory of limited differences’, which argues that small differences in early productivity accumulate to large differences over entire careers, as early success encourages later success. Apart from generally showing why political scientists publish more or less, we specifically identify accumulative advantage as the principal reason why women increasingly fall behind men over the course of their careers.