Perceptual Constancy: Direct versus Constructivist Theories

Author(s):  
J. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Derek H. Brown

This chapter explores the broad thesis that most if not all perceptual experiences are infused or soaked with imaginings. To begin, the author articulates a sense of imagination useful for this discussion, avoids some pitfalls, and incorporates the result into a schematic guidance principle. The thought behind the principle is that imaginative contributions to perceptual experiences are self-generated ingredients to perception that have a reasonably direct, ampliative impact on the relevant perceptual experiences. This framework is then applied to three sets of case studies: object-kind and object-sameness experiences (Strawson 1970); colour (Macpherson 2012); and amodal completion (Nanay 2010) and perceptual constancy. Although the case studies have interesting differences, they all conform to the guidance principle. Since each has the potential to independently justify the thesis that perceptual experiences are infused with imaginings, they collectively provide sound motive to provisionally endorse it.


Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

There are non-uniceptual same-tracking mechanisms, mechanisms that same-track not in order to implement storage of information about their targets, but merely as an aid to the identification of further things. Examples are the various mechanisms of perceptual constancy, self-relative location trackers, object-constancy mechanisms, and same-trackers for real categories. There are also several kinds of unicepts, hence, of unitrackers, procedural, substantive, attributive. What begins as a non-uniceptual same-tracker might or might not be redeployed to serve also as a procedural unitracker, or a procedural unitracker might be redeployed to serve also as a substance unitracker or an attribute unitracker. This is possible because the difference between affordances, substances, and attributes is not a basic ontological distinction but is relative to cognitive use.


Author(s):  
John O’Dea

This chapter defends a solution to the problem of variable appearances that co-occur with perceptual constancy. In conditions which are non-ideal, yet within the range of perceptual constancy, we see things veridically despite a puzzling “appearance” which is suggestive of a non-veridical state of affairs. For example, a tilted coin is often taken to have an “elliptical appearance”. This chapter defends Gestalt-shift approach, according to which these appearances are in fact illusory, but not part of normal perceptual experience. The experience of ellipticality when viewing a tilted coin, it is argued, arises from something like a brief and unstable Gestalt shift to a different visual interpretation of the scene, of the kind that E. H. Gombrich argued artists invoke when painting a three-dimensional scene on a flat canvas. Recent empirical work on multistable perception is used to show how this might work.


2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-243
Author(s):  
Matt E.M. Bower

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.


Language ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-254
Author(s):  
Santiago Barreda

1965 ◽  
Vol 111 (474) ◽  
pp. 383-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McGhie ◽  
James Chapman ◽  
J. S. Lawson

In recent years an increasing number of workers investigating schizophrenic behaviour have concluded that many of the symptoms found in schizophrenia are related to a disturbance in the selective and inhibitory functions of attention. One of the earliest statements of this argument is found in Norman Cameron's (1938, 1939, 1944) concept of “over-inclusion”, which he used to describe the schizophrenic patient's tendency to include many elements irrelevant to the central idea in his thinking. Shakow (1962) reached the following conclusions in summarizing his own psychological studies of schizophrenia—“It is as if, in the scanning process which takes place before the response to stimulus is made, the schizophrenic is unable to select out the material relevant for optimal response. He apparently cannot free himself from the irrelevant among the numerous possibilities available for choice.” Weckowicz and Blewett (1959), in their studies of alterations in perceptual constancy in schizophrenic patients, interpreted their findings as suggesting that the patient's basic difficulty was that of “an inability to attend selectively or to select relevant information“. Venables and his colleagues (1959, 1962, 1963), in a series of studies on the arousal level of schizophrenic patients, also concluded that many of the behavioural abnormalities demonstrated were due to variations in the range of attention. In a series of investigations carried out by Payne and his colleagues (1960, 1961, 1963) to develop Cameron's concept of over-inclusive thinking in schizophrenia, the authors utilized Broad-bent's (1958) model of selective attention to postulate that this form of thought disorder is basically due “to a defect in some hypothetical central filter mechanism, the function of whichis to screen out irrelevant data both internal … and external … to allow for the most efficient processing of incoming information”.


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