Revelation in Phenomenology

This chapter investigates the notion of revelation in the work of the main representatives of the phenomenological movement. This movement has a crucial importance in understanding the philosophical landscape today. Emerging from Austrian and German sources, phenomenology became the leading philosophical school in Europe by the mid-twentieth century. Later developments led to the emergence of French phenomenology, which has defined Continental thought in more than one way. The persistent focus of the phenomenological movement has been the nature and content of religious experience or the religious phenomenon. And while some of the phenomenologists, like Jean-Paul Sartre, proposed a different course for this kind of thinking, the problem of religion has become central to most of the phenomenological authors. This explains the fact that the phenomenological notion of divine disclosure or revelation has always been in the centre of this movement. One can even say that the philosophical problem of revelation is the central subject matter in the history of phenomenology beginning with Franz Brentano through Max Scheler, Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Luc Marion. The work of these and other authors has exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary philosophy. However, the problem of revelation per se is the crucial problem of philosophy, as is demonstrated by the history and problematic of the phenomenological movement. This chapter offers an overview of this history and also an outline of the problem of revelation from the point of view of what can be termed ‘apocalyptic phenomenology’.

Respuesta a Graham Harman (II): Fenomenología y realismo especulativo

En este artículo continuamos el debate con Graham Harman en torno a la filosofía de Ortega, la fenomenología de Husserl y la re-lación (compleja y problemática) entre fenomenología y realismo especulativo. Tras exponer los antecedentes y los temas centrales del debate en un apartado introductorio, dividimos nuestro trabajo en tres grandes apartados. En el primero se exponen algunos conceptos fundamentales de la fenomenología, sobre todo el sentido del idealismo trascendental; la peculiaridad fenomenológica del concepto de inmanencia, y en consecuencia los conceptos de reducción y epojé. En el siguiente apartado se clarifica la vinculación de Ortega y Gasset con el movimiento fenomenológico, que se da hasta mitades de 1929 sin ninguna reticencia, y expo-niendo la crítica orteguiana a partir de ese momento, pero relativizándola. En el apartado último y tercero, al hilo de la discusión crítica de la interpretación que Harman mantiene de am-bas cuestiones, ampliamos el debate a la relación entre fenomenología y realismo especulativo, respondiendo a las objeciones que nos plantea el filósofo norteamericano en su escrito anterior.In this essay we continue the debate with Graham Harman around Ortega's philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology, and the (complex and problematic) relationship between phenomenology and speculative realism. After presenting the background and the central themes of the debate in an introductory section, we divide our paper into three main sections. In the first one, some fundamental concepts of phenomenology are exposed, especially the meaning of transcendental idealism; the phenomenological peculiarity of the concept of immanence, and consequently the concepts of reduction and epoché. In the following section, the link between Ortega y Gasset and the phenomenological movement is clarified, which runs until the middle of 1929 without any reluctance, then the Ortega criticism is exposed from that moment, but relativizing it. In the last and third section, following the critical discussion of Harman's interpretation of both questions, we extend the debate to the relationship between phenomenology and speculative realism, responding to the objections raised by the American philosopher in his previous writing.

Fate of Ideas: Some Reflections on the Enduring Significance of Manfred Frings’ Rejected Translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II

This paper investigates a moment in the history of the phenomenological movement and offers an argument for its enduring significance. To this end, it brings to light, for the first time in a half-century, Manfred Frings’ rejected and so unpublished translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II. After considering the meaning of the term Leib, which Frings renders ‘lived-body’ and to which the editor suggests ‘organism,’ a brief argument for the living tradition of phenomenology is given. It is claimed that the enduring significance of the document is found in the elucidation of the need to renew the phenomenological tradition through a collaboration across generations. Thus, even in its supposed “failure,” Frings’ translation gives data to future thinkers for insight into both their own life and the life of the ideas of phenomenology itself.

PHENOMENOLOGY WITHOUT EGOLOGY: EDITH STEIN AS AN ORIGINAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKER

Edith Stein is considered a leading figure in the early phenomenological movement and the disciple who performed in the best way the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl, and yet her relationship to phenomenology remains unclear in the literature. This article seeks to add clarity to her relationship to phenomenology while considering three inescapably related questions. (1) What did Stein conceive phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? (3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? I argue that Stein conceives of phenomenology as an epistemological critique that aims to clarify the essential foundations of knowledge. It involves intentional analysis that proceeds by way of essential-seeing (Wesensschau), which can be brought about through the method of free imaginative variation, and its intentional analysis involves close attention to the relationship between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. I argue that the primary influence Husserl exerts on Stein is in the development of phenomenology as conceived in his Logical Investigations. Finally, I offer an understanding of how Stein conceived of her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that Stein’s phenomenological writings in On the Problem of Empathy and “Sentient Causality” offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the ego but escapes being a mere egology. Edith Stein’s phenomenology of the human person begins with the ego and its experiences, and yet, she identifies within those experiences a certain kind of extra-egoic content, viz. experiences of my sentient states.

UNKNOWN HEROES OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE: S. HODGSON AND G.F. STOUT

S. Hodgson and G.F. Stout were remarkable, but insufficiently studied philosophers and presidents of the early Aristotelian society. The report is about their conceptions which despite almost unknown in the contemporary philosophy make us pay attention to them. For example S. Hodgson’s philosophy was the subject of discussion about its place in the phenomenological movement. G.F. Stout’s philosophy is interesting not only because he was the G.E. Moore’s and B. Russel’s lecturer. His philosophy was arguably ascribed to idealistic direction in British philosophy of XIX–XX century. There are few contemporary studies where the influence of G.F. Stout on the emergence of analytical philosophy is considered. The report will consider the metaphilosophical role of "common sense in G.F. Stout’s philosophy.

A Brief History and Overview of Existential-Phenomenological Psychology

This article surveys the background and theory of the existential-phenomenological approach to psychology, with a particular focus on its reception in the United States. The article begins with a discussion of what exactly existential-phenomenological psychology is, including the theories underlying this approach and its basic practices. The article then discusses how the approach developed, including its roots in the philosophies of existentialism and phenomenology, its first appearances in Europe, its globalization, and finally its arrival in the U.S. The article then discusses struggles that the existential-phenomenological movement in psychology is currently facing and the concerns of those involved in the movement for its future. Finally, the article closes on a summary of all the information presented as well as of the contributions to the field of psychology that it and the existential-phenomenological movement can make. KEYWORDS: Existentialism; Phenomenology; Psychology; United States; Existential Psychology; Phenomenological Psychology; Existential Psychotherapy; Philosophy of Psychology

Phenomenology in Central Europe: Philosophy from the margins

The aim of the paper is twofold: first, to enrich the factual historical record of the phenomenological movement in the second half of the 20th century in a Central European context by presenting two representatives of this movement who are now relatively unknown in the Czechoslovak philosophical milieu (Marie Bayerová and Josef Cibulka). The genealogy of this stream of phenomenology has been shaped by the difficult conditions under which philosophy was conducted. The second aim is to use the genealogy to describe the type of phenomenology that developed in this milieu. The article considers minor figures in the phenomenological movement, by exploring philosophy, both “in margine” and from the centre. It also consider the concept of “state of emergency”. Taking these pointers of philosophical analysis (elaborated by Jan Patočka and Milan Šimečka in their time) we reveal the anthropological conditions of philosophizing and the type of phenomenology.

Reisetagebuch eines Phänomenologen

The travel diary has its origin in world-wide research and teaching contacts. The history of the phenomenological movement is completed by global geography. Intercultural relations have regard to philosophy, science, art, religion and everyday life. Famous names turn up like Boulez, Derrida, Levinas or Ricœur. Authors like Joyce, Kafka Proust and Kierkegaard appear in their home environment. There are trips crossing the black Harlem. One meets traces of war and violence in the streets of Sarajevo or Bogotà and at the memorial places of Auschwitz, Kaunas or Kiev. The margins of Europe are reached in Istanbul, Tbilisi, Tunis and Jerusalem. The author is an international known phenomenologist.