Extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Bryan ◽  
Terry W. Mason
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Serena F. Hagerty ◽  
Bhavya Mohan ◽  
Michael I. Norton

Abstract Four experiments examine the impact of a firm deciding to no longer pay salaries for executives versus employees on consumer behavior, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 1 explores the effect of announcing either pay cessations or continued pay for either CEO or employees, and shows that firms’ commitment to maintaining employee pay leads to the most positive consumer reactions. Study 2 examines the effects of simultaneously announcing employee and CEO pay cessations: consumers respond most positively to firms prioritizing employee pay, regardless of their strategy for CEO pay. Moreover, these positive perceptions are mediated by perceptions of financial pain to employees, more than perceptions of CEO-to-worker pay ratio fairness. Study 3, using an incentive-compatible design, shows that firms’ commitment to paying employees their full wages matters more to consumers than cuts to executive pay, even when those executive pay cuts lead to a lower CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Study 4 tests our account in a non-COVID-19 context, and shows that consumers continue to react favorably to firms that maintain employee pay, but when loss is less salient, consumers prioritize cutting CEO pay and lowering the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We discuss the implications of our results for firms and policymakers during economic crises.


CFA Digest ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-34
Author(s):  
Mark A. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. A1-A12 ◽  
Author(s):  
X. Jasmine Bordere ◽  
Conrad S. Ciccotello ◽  
C. Terry Grant

SUMMARY This paper examines a sample of 36 firms that received a majority of negative shareholder votes on their executive compensation plan in the first round of Dodd-Frank mandated “say-on-pay” voting in 2011. Relative to a control group, the 36 firms tend to perform poorly and have high CEO pay in the pre-vote period, and especially in 2010. We find that about 20 percent of the rejected firms also had income-decreasing restatements that impact the five-year period before the vote, compared to only 3 percent for a control group. The rejected firm sample also has weaker internal controls, as well as greater increases in audit fees in the year before the vote. The voting highlights how rejected firms tend to have higher audit risk environments in the years preceding the say-on-pay vote. In addition, since over half of the restatements occur after the say-on-pay vote, the findings also suggest that auditors should use voting as an input to their risk assessments.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-52
Author(s):  
Pieter de Jong ◽  
Lakshmi Goel
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

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