Along with the separation of ownership and control in modern companies, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a core issue in corporate law. In recent decades, there was a trend of increasing executive compensation in many countries, which led to shareholders’ dissatisfaction and social concerns about the income gap. Since directors did not effectively solve the problem of excessive executive remuneration, many countries introduced the advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report (‘Say on Pay’). It is a new mechanism that allows shareholders to vote on executive remuneration. After it was first introduced in the UK, many other countries including the US adopted ‘Say on Pay’ to relieve the problem of excessive executive remuneration. However, there is an ongoing debate about whether ‘Say on Pay’ has a meaningful influence on excessive executive compensation. Some believe that shareholder voting results lead directors to create better executive remuneration plans. Others argue that ‘Say on Pay’ contributes little to solving this problem. It is therefore essential to analyse the effects of ‘Say on Pay’ on solving the excessive executive remuneration problem in the UK and the US. This essay will analyse several arguments related to the influence of ‘Say on Pay’ on excessive executive compensation in order to demonstrate the reasons why ‘Say on Pay’ contributes little to solving the excessive executive remuneration problem in the UK and the US.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use corporate governance and SOP data to test the relationships amongst variables. Additional analysis is performed using one-to-one propensity-score matched samples.
Findings
The authors find that firm-years with at least a female member present on the compensation committee are associated with lower SOP dissent. The authors find mixed results of the impact of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.
Practical implications
This paper suggests that diversity on the compensation committee, particularly the presence of at least a female member on the committee, serves as an important determinant of SOP voting outcome in the USA. The paper provides policymakers and practitioners with insights into factors influencing SOP voting outcomes and implications of SOP dissent for firms.
Originality/value
The findings of this paper contribute to the corporate governance literature by enhancing the understanding of the role of the compensation committee as it relates to SOP dissent and effect of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.