The dilemma between ethics and reputation: evidence of earnings management following CEO pay cuts for women

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Wan-Ci Huang ◽  
Wu-Po Liu
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-447
Author(s):  
Andrea Gouldman ◽  
Lisa Victoravich

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of adverse consequences regarding the recently enacted Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) pay-equity disclosure requirement in the USA, which will likely lead to lower levels of perceived Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay fairness by subordinates. Specifically, the study examines whether the pay-equity disclosure leads to increased earnings management when business-unit managers have friendship ties with the CEO. Design/methodology/approach An experiment is conducted wherein participants assume the role of a business-unit manager and are asked to provide an estimate for future warranty expense, which is used as a proxy for earnings management. The study manipulates friendship between the CEO and a business-unit manager and the saliency of CEO compensation pay-equity. Findings CEO friendship ties, which are associated with lower levels of social distance, result in less earning management in the absence of the DFA CEO pay-equity ratio disclosure. However, CEO friendship may result in negative repercussions in terms of higher earnings management in the post-DFA environment when managers are provided with the pay-equity disclosure. Research limitations/implications Future research may expand this study by examining how the adverse consequences of the CEO compensation saliency disclosure can be mitigated. Practical implications Management, audit committees and internal auditors should consider the possibility of unintended consequences of the increased transparency of CEO pay-equity while designing management control systems. Social implications This study highlights the importance of understanding how employees’ social relationships with leaders may influence their behavior. Originality/value Unlike prior research, which focuses on senior executives’ direct incentives to manipulate earnings and subsequently increase their compensation, this study provides evidence regarding the earnings management behavior of business-unit managers.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 869-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Laux ◽  
Volker Laux

ABSTRACT:We analyze the board of directors' equilibrium strategies for setting CEO incentive pay and overseeing financial reporting and their effects on the level of earnings management. We show that an increase in CEO equity incentives does not necessarily increase earnings management because directors adjust their oversight effort in response to a change in CEO incentives. If the board's responsibilities for setting CEO pay and monitoring are separated through the formation of committees, then the compensation committee will increase the use of stock-based CEO pay, as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Bryan ◽  
Terry W. Mason
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Serena F. Hagerty ◽  
Bhavya Mohan ◽  
Michael I. Norton

Abstract Four experiments examine the impact of a firm deciding to no longer pay salaries for executives versus employees on consumer behavior, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 1 explores the effect of announcing either pay cessations or continued pay for either CEO or employees, and shows that firms’ commitment to maintaining employee pay leads to the most positive consumer reactions. Study 2 examines the effects of simultaneously announcing employee and CEO pay cessations: consumers respond most positively to firms prioritizing employee pay, regardless of their strategy for CEO pay. Moreover, these positive perceptions are mediated by perceptions of financial pain to employees, more than perceptions of CEO-to-worker pay ratio fairness. Study 3, using an incentive-compatible design, shows that firms’ commitment to paying employees their full wages matters more to consumers than cuts to executive pay, even when those executive pay cuts lead to a lower CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Study 4 tests our account in a non-COVID-19 context, and shows that consumers continue to react favorably to firms that maintain employee pay, but when loss is less salient, consumers prioritize cutting CEO pay and lowering the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We discuss the implications of our results for firms and policymakers during economic crises.


CFA Digest ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-34
Author(s):  
Mark A. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-52
Author(s):  
Pieter de Jong ◽  
Lakshmi Goel
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Pay ◽  

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Dwikky Darmawan ◽  
Weny Putri

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of political connection toward the earnings management of service sector companies with control variables firm size and audit quality. Firm�s political connection measured by using dummy variable. Earnings management is proxied by discretionary accrual which is measured by using Modified Jones Model. The research data applied in this study are the secondary data which are taken from the annual reports of service sector companies that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange of 2016-2017 periods. There are 330 observations fit as sample, which are taken by using purposive sampling method. Data are processed by applying the multiple linear regression test. The result show that the political connection had positive but not significant influence to earnings management. Firm size had negative but not significant influence to earnings management. Whereas the audit quality had a negative and significant influence to earnings management.


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