MRA: A modified reverse auction based framework for incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsensing systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 137-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samad Saadatmand ◽  
Salil S. Kanhere
2015 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 95-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantinos Marios Angelopoulos ◽  
Sotiris Nikoletseas ◽  
Theofanis P. Raptis ◽  
José Rolim

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 805
Author(s):  
Jia Xu ◽  
Shangshu Yang ◽  
Weifeng Lu ◽  
Lijie Xu ◽  
Dejun Yang

The recent development of human-carried mobile devices has promoted the great development of mobile crowdsensing systems. Most existing mobile crowdsensing systems depend on the crowdsensing service of the deep cloud. With the increasing scale and complexity, there is a tendency to enhance mobile crowdsensing with the edge computing paradigm to reduce latency and computational complexity, and improve the expandability and security. In this paper, we propose an integrated solution to stimulate the strategic users to contribute more for truth discovery in the edge-assisted mobile crowdsensing. We design an incentive mechanism consisting of truth discovery stage and budget feasible reverse auction stage. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task in both deep cloud and edge cloud. In budget feasible reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners to maximize the quality function under the budget constraint. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is computationally efficient, individually rational, truthful, budget feasible and constant approximate. Moreover, the proposed mechanism shows great superiority in terms of estimation precision and expandability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yatong Chen ◽  
Huangxun Chen ◽  
Shuo Yang ◽  
Xiaofeng Gao ◽  
Yunhe Guo ◽  
...  

In the past decade, with the rapid development of wireless communication and sensor technology, ubiquitous smartphones equipped with increasingly rich sensors have more powerful computing and sensing abilities. Thus, mobile crowdsensing has received extensive attentions from both industry and academia. Recently, plenty of mobile crowdsensing applications come forth, such as indoor positioning, environment monitoring, and transportation. However, most existing mobile crowdsensing systems lack vast user bases and thus urgently need appropriate incentive mechanisms to attract mobile users to guarantee the service quality. In this paper, we propose to incorporate sensing platform and social network applications, which already have large user bases to build a three-layer network model. Thus, we can publicize the sensing platform promptly in large scale and provide long-term guarantee of data sources. Based on a three-layer network model, we design incentive mechanisms for both intermediaries and the crowdsensing platform and provide a solution to cope with the problem of user overlapping among intermediaries. We theoretically prove the properties of our proposed incentive mechanisms, including incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and efficiency. Furthermore, we evaluate our incentive mechanisms by extensive simulations. Evaluation results validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 3992-4002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinglin Zhang ◽  
Le Jiang ◽  
Xiumin Wang

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 1220-1232
Author(s):  
Xin Chen ◽  
Chao Tang ◽  
Zhuo Li ◽  
Lianyong Qi ◽  
Ying Chen ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jiangtian Nie ◽  
Jun Luo ◽  
Zehui Xiong ◽  
Dusit Niyato ◽  
Ping Wang ◽  
...  

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