A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

2019 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 108567
Author(s):  
Madhuparna Karmokar ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Ton Storcken
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Dolors Berga-Colom ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Private Good ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Cross-Monotonic in Cost Sharing Mechanisms Using Ns2

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
R Ganesan ◽  
Justin Joseph ◽  
Jisha Isaac
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Key Techniques ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A cost-sharing plan is an arrangement of guidelines characterizing how to distribute the cost among adjusted clients. A cost-sharing strategy is check monotonic in case it satisfies the property that everyone is in a flawless circumstance when the course of action of individuals who get the affiliation creates. CM is a property that passes on a customer's part ought to be more humble when balanced in a more imperative set. CM is an key techniques to achieve the group strategy proofness. By using the multicast plans that objective the enhanced directing, cross-monotonic cost sharing, and stabilize budget. Unsurprising degree cost recuperations is conceivable, and also apply a primal-twofold diagram to in the meantime create an organizing strategy and a cost-sharing course of action, and demonstrate that the subsequent instrument is collect framework proof and ensures off base cost recuperation against a flawless coordinating game plan.  

A Strategy-Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD E. CAMPBELL ◽  
JERRY S. KELLY
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

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