scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
The Many ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

scholarly journals Matching with floor constraints

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 911-942
Author(s):  
Sumeyra Akin
Keyword(s):  
Additional Condition ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Medical Residency ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Prominent Feature ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Teacher Assignment ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Hard Floor

Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy‐proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Dolors Berga-Colom ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Private Good ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero‐Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Cross-Monotonic in Cost Sharing Mechanisms Using Ns2

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
R Ganesan ◽  
Justin Joseph ◽  
Jisha Isaac
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Key Techniques ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A cost-sharing plan is an arrangement of guidelines characterizing how to distribute the cost among adjusted clients. A cost-sharing strategy is check monotonic in case it satisfies the property that everyone is in a flawless circumstance when the course of action of individuals who get the affiliation creates. CM is a property that passes on a customer's part ought to be more humble when balanced in a more imperative set. CM is an key techniques to achieve the group strategy proofness. By using the multicast plans that objective the enhanced directing, cross-monotonic cost sharing, and stabilize budget. Unsurprising degree cost recuperations is conceivable, and also apply a primal-twofold diagram to in the meantime create an organizing strategy and a cost-sharing course of action, and demonstrate that the subsequent instrument is collect framework proof and ensures off base cost recuperation against a flawless coordinating game plan.  

Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima
Keyword(s):  
Japanese Government ◽  
Medical Residents ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
New System ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Real matching markets are subject to constraints. For example, the Japanese government introduced a new medical matching system in 2009 that imposes a “regional cap” in each of its 47 prefectures, which regulates the total number of medical residents who can be employed in each region. Based on Kamada and Kojima (2011), this paper studies matching markets with such constraints by examining in great detail the Japanese medical matching market. Specifically, we show that the new system introduced in 2009 has problems in terms of stability and strategy-proofness, and provide an alternative mechanism that does better.

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