Competition in dual-channel supply chains: The manufacturers' channel selection

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yumeng Zhang ◽  
Behzad Hezarkhani
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Dual Channel

Channel Selection in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Dong-Ping Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Dual Channel

Channel Selection and Coordination in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

2010 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Dual Channel

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

Game theoretic analysis for advertising models in dual-channel supply chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 256-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ningning Wang ◽  
Ting Zhang ◽  
Xiaojun Fan ◽  
Xiaoxuan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Advertising Models ◽  
Game Theoretic

Dual-Channel Supply Chains and Risk-Averse Behaviors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Bo Li ◽  
Dong-Ping Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Dual Channel

scholarly journals Channel Selection Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain: A Consumer-Driven Perspective

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 145634-145648
Author(s):  
Yongshi Hu ◽  
Jing Lin ◽  
Xiao-Li Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Should a Manufacturer Encroach on Its Retailer’s Operations with Quality Differentiated Products?

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junwu Chai ◽  
Huan Chen ◽  
Qilin Huang ◽  
Wei Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Dual Channel

Despite the fact that manufacturers are progressively encroaching into the retail market by selling products that differ in quality from the products that are already on the market, this issue has received little attention in the literature on dual-channel supply chains. We fill this gap by first considering that a manufacturer sells higher- (lower-) quality products through its own direct channel, whereas all lower- (higher-) quality products are distributed by an independent retailer, and then comparing our equilibrium outcomes with those in the literature of the manufacturer who distributes homogeneous products through both channels. Our results show that, compared to selling lower-quality products directly or offering homogeneous products through both channels, an effort by the manufacturer that is too aggressive in its attempt to encroach on the retail market (i.e., selling higher-quality products directly) not only decreases the retailer’s profits but also reduces the manufacturer’s own profitability. Furthermore, we find that, compared with offering homogeneous products through both channels, selling lower-quality products directly is always beneficial for the retailer but hurts consumers.

Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains

2010 ◽  
Vol 205 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guowei Hua ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
T.C.E. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Dual Channel
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