Internet of Vehicles Service in Dual Channel Supply Chains: Who Should Provide?

Author(s):  
Zhang Rong ◽  
Liu Bin
Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.


2021 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Dong-Ping Song

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junwu Chai ◽  
Huan Chen ◽  
Qilin Huang ◽  
Wei Yan

Despite the fact that manufacturers are progressively encroaching into the retail market by selling products that differ in quality from the products that are already on the market, this issue has received little attention in the literature on dual-channel supply chains. We fill this gap by first considering that a manufacturer sells higher- (lower-) quality products through its own direct channel, whereas all lower- (higher-) quality products are distributed by an independent retailer, and then comparing our equilibrium outcomes with those in the literature of the manufacturer who distributes homogeneous products through both channels. Our results show that, compared to selling lower-quality products directly or offering homogeneous products through both channels, an effort by the manufacturer that is too aggressive in its attempt to encroach on the retail market (i.e., selling higher-quality products directly) not only decreases the retailer’s profits but also reduces the manufacturer’s own profitability. Furthermore, we find that, compared with offering homogeneous products through both channels, selling lower-quality products directly is always beneficial for the retailer but hurts consumers.


2010 ◽  
Vol 205 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guowei Hua ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
T.C.E. Cheng
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950027
Author(s):  
Chengli Liu ◽  
C. K. M. Lee ◽  
K. H. Leung

In this paper, loss-averse consumer behavior during purchase decision-making process in the dual-channel supply chain is modeled. Loss-averse consumers prefer avoiding losses to gain utility with respect to their reference point while purchasing the product. Two product categories are classified: (1) basic product and (2) luxury goods which have lower and higher reference utility to consumers, respectively. The research objective is to determine the optimal price strategy in dual-channel supply chains and discuss the decision behind loss-averse consumers. To model consumers’ valuation of a product, prospect theory is adopted to calculate the demands of each channel. Then, the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding profits are found out in a Stackelberg game manner. The results encourage manufacturers of basic goods to engage in dual-channel strategy. Effect of “double marginalization” is reduced if consumers are loss-averse in the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the direct channel online contributes larger demand to the manufacturer. However, manufacturers of luxury goods are not suggested for dual-channel strategy because the demand for direct channel online is negligible and the demand for the retail channel remains unchanged. Nevertheless, retailers cannot obtain benefit from dual-channel and as a result, the profit of basic goods retailers will be reduced.


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