Pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chains with service cooperation under asymmetric information

Author(s):  
Guojun Ji ◽  
Muhong Yu
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Wei ◽  
Tong Shao ◽  
Jing Zhao

This paper studies the effect of dual-channel format on supply chain’s competition ability and the effect of different bargaining powers on the competition between two supply chains and the optimal pricing decisions of all supply chain members when one supply chain introduces an online retailing channel. We develop four game models and obtain the optimal pricing decisions in closed form of these models and give some sensitivity analysis through numerical approach. Some new managerial insights are obtained as follows: Regardless of the two supply chain members’ bargaining forms, the optimal price, the maximal demand, and the maximal profit decrease as the self-price sensitivity decreases. The industry holds advantage in getting higher profit when the supply chain without online retailing channel is led by the retailer. In addition, we find that a manufacturer as a leader of its supply chain can get more profit when the competing supply chain’s leader is the manufacturer than when the competing supply chain’s leader is the retailer.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.


Author(s):  
Mohammadali Vosooghidizaji ◽  
◽  
Atour Taghipour ◽  
Béatrice Canel-Depitre

Supply chains consist of several actors from supplier, manufacturer, distributer, wholesaler and retailers connected to each other by financial, material and informational flows. Optimal performance of supply chains requires set of actions that coordinate the members’ decisions [1], [2]. In many cases, members are trying to optimize their own objectives which can lead to asymmetric information by keeping some strategic information private. Although, this information asymmetry is a challenge affecting the coordination of supply chain, but it is achievable if proper set of coordinating mechanism executed. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and tries to analyze the trend in the context and address the evolution and gaps in existing literature.


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