scholarly journals A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Echenique ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez
Keyword(s):  
Matching With Preferences

scholarly journals Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching

2010 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 773-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Duke Kominers
Keyword(s):  
Matching With Preferences

Mobility Load Balancing Method for Self-Organizing Wireless Networks Inspired by Synchronization and Matching With Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 2594-2606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaesung Park ◽  
Youngjae Kim ◽  
Jung-Ryun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Wireless Networks ◽  
Load Balancing ◽  
Matching With Preferences ◽  
Self Organizing

scholarly journals A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Echenique ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez
Keyword(s):  
Matching With Preferences

Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model

1986 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 165-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bartholdi ◽  
Michael A Trick
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matching ◽  
Psychological Model ◽  
Matching With Preferences

scholarly journals How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Bichler ◽  
Alexander Hammerl ◽  
Thayer Morrill ◽  
Stefan Waldherr
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Field Data ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Efficient Allocation ◽  
Matching Problem ◽  
Maximum Capacity ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
Matching With Preferences

Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available. It is well known that it is impossible to combine all three properties of truthfulness, efficiency, and fairness (i.e., envy freeness) in matching with preferences. Established mechanisms are either efficient or envy free, and the efficiency loss in envy-free mechanisms is substantial. We focus on a widespread representative of a matching problem: course assignment where students have preferences for courses and organizers have priorities over students. An important feature in course assignment is that a course has a maximum capacity and a minimum required quota. This is also a requirement in many other matching applications, such as school choice, hospital-residents matching, or the assignment of workers to jobs. We introduce RESPCT, a mechanism that respects minimum quotas and is truthful, efficient, and has low levels of envy. The reduction in envy is significant and is due to two remarkably effective heuristics. We provide analytical and experimental results based on field data from a large-scale course assignment application. These results have led to a policy change and the proposed assignment system is now being used to match hundreds of students every semester.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document