THE IMPACT OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF OLDER PEOPLE ON INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS FROM THEIR ADULT CHILDREN IN CHINA

Based on three waves of the nationally representative survey conducted in 2005, 2008-2009, and 2011-2012, this study investigates the effect of living arrangements on intergenerational transfers in China. Outcomes of interest include monetary transfers, contact, informal care, and emotional support that adult children provide to older parents. Both actual living arrangements and the discrepancy between actual and preferred living arrangements are considered. Endogeneity bias is accounted for through fixed-effects instrumental-variable regression modeling. It is found that co-residence serves as a substitute for monetary transfers and is positively associated with the probability that parents would receive contact, informal care and emotional support from adult children. Living alone with children in the same city is positively associated with the receipt of monetary transfers and contact by older parents but is not statistically related to the other two outcomes. There is an expressed desire for independent living among older people, which impacts transfer behaviors in a complex manner. This study provides a better understanding of the role of the family amidst ongoing social security reforms in China.

Communities, Co-ops, and Clubs: Social Capital and Incentives in Large Collective Organizations

We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member’s output is an imperfect signal of his underlying effort, and each member’s utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to other members’ efforts. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two channels: expulsion following poor performance and respite following good performance. We derive the steady state distribution of members’ continuation utilities for arbitrary values of the initial and maximum continuation utilities and then optimize these values according to organizational objectives. An optimally designed organization can be implemented by associating continuation utilities with a performance-tracking reputation system. (JEL Z13, D23, D86, P13, D82)

The Association between Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Cohort Fertility: Evidence from Brazil

Brazil’s Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) aims to combat poverty and social inequalities through monetary transfers to families. A much-discussed indirect effect of the programme was its correlation to the fertility of the beneficiary families. In this paper, we use a cohort fertility approach with parity progression ratios that differs from existing literature, which mainly used period fertility measures, to better understand the relationship between fertility and the BFP. This study analyses the relationship between the BFP and the reproduction of Brazilian women. We use data from the 2010 Brazilian micro-censuses, the only census after the start of the BFP in 2004, to reconstruct the childbirth history of women with incomplete reproductive cycles (women aged 25 to 29), and estimate parity progression ratios (PPRs) and cohort fertility rates (CFR). In addition, we estimate propensity score matching (PSM) models comparing fertility outcomes of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the programme. Our results show distinct differences in CFRs and PPRs. On average, BFP beneficiaries had more children than women not covered by the programme. This finding remained consistent even after controlling for educational gradients and other covariates. Our empirical findings show that women opt for a “rational” strategy, where they tend to have children in more rapid succession up until three children. These findings contradict the recent literature that has not found any correlation between BFP and fertility. The results also suggest that cohort analyses may fill certain gaps left by previous studies of period fertility. This paper is one of a few that have analysed the relationship between a conditional income transfer programme and cohort measures in Brazil.

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

Environmental valuation using bargaining games: an application to water

We characterize a general bargaining game useful for environmental valuation purposes. In this game, a jointly endowed asset is divisible into smaller units of two types: those with and without an associated costly attribute. Bargaining parties can use monetary transfers to their counterpart in exchange for accruing more units of the jointly endowed asset. We show that the cost of the attribute is perfectly absorbed by the transfer in a broad set of game solutions. Outcomes differing in the allocation of the units with the costly attribute allows us to identify whether the players' valuation of the attribute corresponds to its value induced in the game (i.e., its cost) or whether this attribute is over-or under-valued. We show an application to the valuation of water in a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted with Colombian farmers. We find evidence that the players' valuation of in-plot access to water dwells between 2.1 and 3.5 times its induced cost in the experiment.

How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair

Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available. It is well known that it is impossible to combine all three properties of truthfulness, efficiency, and fairness (i.e., envy freeness) in matching with preferences. Established mechanisms are either efficient or envy free, and the efficiency loss in envy-free mechanisms is substantial. We focus on a widespread representative of a matching problem: course assignment where students have preferences for courses and organizers have priorities over students. An important feature in course assignment is that a course has a maximum capacity and a minimum required quota. This is also a requirement in many other matching applications, such as school choice, hospital-residents matching, or the assignment of workers to jobs. We introduce RESPCT, a mechanism that respects minimum quotas and is truthful, efficient, and has low levels of envy. The reduction in envy is significant and is due to two remarkably effective heuristics. We provide analytical and experimental results based on field data from a large-scale course assignment application. These results have led to a policy change and the proposed assignment system is now being used to match hundreds of students every semester.

COVID-19 monetary transfer in El Salvador: determining factors

Given the lack of governmental guidelines, this paper identifies and analyzes the statistical determinants associated with receiving the onetime monetary transfer in El Salvador ($300 dollars) as an economic measure to face the COVID-19 pandemic. A logistic regression was implemented (whether received the transfer or not) based on a probabilistic sample (n=1222) of surveyed people throughout the country. Independent variables were selected drawing upon key characteristics employed internationally in monetary transfers: age, gender, rural area, employment, family income, and education. The text identifies a statistically significant and negative relation between receiving the monetary transfer and two variables: family income and educational level. The need to increase coverage of the program is addressed as well as the importance of considering age, gender, rural areas, and employment as criteria for selecting the beneficiaries in such economic measures.

10 Monetary Transfers and Treatment

This chapter describes the treatment accorded to monetary transfers by investment treaties. Nearly all investment treaties grant covered investors or investments the freedom to make monetary transfers. However, the precise nature of such provisions in particular treaties depends upon the differing interests of host country governments. While investors want broad and unrestricted guarantees on monetary transfers, host states seek, in varying degrees, to limit their commitments with respect to monetary transfers and to subject them to qualifications and exceptions. Although the provisions on monetary transfers vary from treaty to treaty, they all tend to address six basic issues: (1) the general scope of the investor's rights to make monetary transfers; (2) the types of payments that are covered by such rights; (3) the nature of the currency in which payments may be made; (4) the applicable exchange rate; (5) the time within which the host state must allow the investor to make transfers; and (6) exceptions to the right to make monetary transfers.

Relationships in the Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers: The Provision of Health in the Oportunidades-Prospera Programme in Puebla, Mexico

This article explores interactions between the front-line officers and recipients of Oportunidades-Prospera, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) in Mexico. Like other CCTs, Oportunidades-Prospera provided monetary transfers to families with the requirement of following certain conditions, including receiving preventive healthcare and workshops. This produced constant and compulsory physician-recipient interactions. This article examines these through observations of programme delivery and interviews with physicians at health centres of two localities of Puebla. The results show that officers’ strategies of implementation and attitudes towards recipients were influenced by the programme’s use of health services as conditionalities, promoting a relationship of authority and obedience. This, however, was exacerbated by the officer’s job position. Those with a permanent contract systematically fostered authoritarian interactions compared to officers with temporary contracts. Ultimately, this study reveals factors that influence officer-recipient relationships in CCTs and their centrality for programme delivery and for the success of social policies more broadly.