scholarly journals School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms

2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joana Pais ◽  
Ágnes Pintér
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Yingzhi Liang ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

2006 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

2011 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 392-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1860-1874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21)


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document