Do More Options Always Benefit the Users of Public Services? An Experimental Study of School Choice, Performance, and Satisfaction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan P. Lee ◽  
Sebastian Jilke ◽  
Oliver James
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Yingzhi Liang ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

2006 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

2016 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 109-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurora García-Gallego ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Tarek Jaber-López ◽  
Gianandrea Staffiero

2011 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 392-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1860-1874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21)


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