scholarly journals School choice under complete information: An experimental study

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Yingzhi Liang ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez
2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 651-664
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Mojašević ◽  
Branko Radulović

The subject of this paper is the contrast effect in negotiations from the behavioral economics perspective. We conducted an experimental study using a "divorce litigation game" with complete information about payoffs aimed at testing whether participants are prone to context-dependent decisions. The sample was created by 100 law students from the Faculty of Law of the University of Niš. In a "between subjects" design 100 different participants were tested in the control and treatment group. The main finding is that there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups, thus confirming the presence of the contrast effect. The study opens the door to further real experiments with an emphasis on other subjects, such as lawyers, checking if they are so "rational"


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 344-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Datuk Ary Adriansyah Samsura ◽  
Adrian van Deemen ◽  
Erwin van der Krabben ◽  
Rob van der Heijden

This paper reports an experiment based on the model of bilateral sequential bargaining over the distribution of a certain value in a laboratory setting within a real specific context of property development in the Netherlands. We have involved only property development professionals as participants in the experiment who have experience with the context. We have also extended the experiment into three different negotiation games distinguished by the availability of information to the participants: a negotiation game with incomplete information, asymmetric information, and complete information. We have found in this experiment that the availability of information could affect the plausibility to reach an agreement, particularly due to a restricted communication setting. This study also provides evidences that it is in the negotiators’ concern to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, which is defined here as the equilibrium, regardless the availability of the information to them.


2006 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

2011 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 392-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1860-1874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21)


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document