scholarly journals Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games

2021 ◽  
Vol 276 ◽  
pp. 104557
Author(s):  
Stéphane Le Roux ◽  
Arno Pauly
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Games

scholarly journals Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branislav Bošanský ◽  
Simina Brânzei ◽  
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen ◽  
Troels Bjerre Lund ◽  
Peter Bro Miltersen
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Games

Crisis Learning Games

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Leng
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Cooperative Strategy ◽  
Learning Games ◽  
Sequential Games ◽  
Initial Strategy ◽  
Tit For Tat

Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.

scholarly journals Modelling imitation with sequential games

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 686-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Colman
Keyword(s):  
Social Influence ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Sequential Games ◽  
Subjective Utility ◽  
Simple Models

A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.

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