Synergistic Effects in Ultrafine Amorphous InSxOy Nanowires Boost Photocatalytic Syngas Production from CO2

Visible-light-driven synthesis of syngas has been widely regarded as an ingenious strategy to realize the comprehensive utilization of CO2. Herein, a cooperative strategy basing on S-atoms substitution and morphology regulations...

Analysis of long-term strategies of riparian countries in transboundary river basins

Transboundary river basins give rise to complex water-sharing decision making that can be analyzed as a game in the sense of dynamic game theory, as done in this work. The sharing of transboundary water resources depends on the long-term shifting interactions between upstream and downstream countries, which has received limited research attention in the past. The water-sharing strategy of a riparian country depends on the strategies of other countries over time. This paper presents an evolutionary game method to analyze the long-term water-sharing strategies of countries encompassing transboundary river basins over time. The method analyzes the evolutionary strategies of riparian countries and investigates evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) considering the payoff matrix. The evolutionary game method is applied to a river basin shared by three countries assuming two types of benefits and one type of cost to countries as decision variables of a game that reflects water use, economic and political gains, and socio-economic losses of countries. Numerical examples illustrate the strategies resulting from the evolutionary game processes and the role of several parameters on the interaction between riparian countries. The countries’ strategies are analyzed for several levels of benefits and costs, and the convergence of the strategies to a stable point is assessed. Results demonstrate the role that the upstream country’s potential benefits and the cost of conflict (i.e., non-cooperation) to other countries has on reaching a stable point in the game. This work’s results show the potential benefit to the upstream country under cooperative strategy must exceed its benefits from water use under non-cooperative strategy to gain the full stable cooperation of downstream countries. This work provides a method to resolve water-sharing strategies by countries sharing transboundary river basins and to evaluate the implications of cooperation or non-cooperation.

Relationship between Strategic Leadership & Cooperative Strategy: The Moderating Role of Clan Culture. (A Case of Small and Medium Sector Organizations of Pakistan)

Organizational culture has attracted a great interest by theorists and researchers since many years. Leadership in organizations have emphasized on the internal culture strengths and ways to improve the efficiency by incorporating various strategies. Cooperative strategy is being associated with internal strengths and relationship and has been a primary focus area in large organizations with ample opportunity for innovation. Small and medium enterprises however, struggled with innovation and competitiveness. To foster growth, strategic leadership stressed to adopt cooperative strategies and cooperative environment. The current study attempts to reveal the underlying mechanism through which the strategic leadership can improve organizational performance through clan culture and cooperative strategies. Based on the Competing value framework and Resource based view of the firms, This research model was selected and analyzed. Clan culture is used as a moderator variable. The model explores the local Pakistani business leadership strategies in family run businesses as well as small and medium enterprises. Strategic leadership is taken as independent variable while cooperative strategy as dependent variable, Clan culture moderates the relationship between the strategic leadership and cooperative strategies. Resource based view provides a framework to analyze the role of firms tangible and intangible resources to achieve competitive advantage. Data was collected from 294 respondents through survey method. All questionnaires were personally administered. AMOS was used to test the moderated model. The moderated relationship among strategic leadership, clan culture and cooperative strategy resulted significant. Clan culture moderated relationship between Strategic leadership & cooperative strategy. This study contributes towards the enhanced application of clan culture and cooperative environment in the small and medium sized organizations as well as family owned businesses. To combat competition from larger organizations and substitute products, cooperative strategy can be very effective. Keywords: Strategic Leadership, Organizational Culture, Clan Culture, Cooperative Strategy, SME.

Perception of Identity, Perception of Relationship and Strategic Interaction — An Analysis on China–Indian Border Disputes from the Perspective of Game Theories

Based on the continuous observation of the ongoing China–India border conflict in recent years, the author intends to answer why China has not yielded prospective policy returns from the Indian side, even if it has been pursuing a cooperative strategy toward India after the Doklam standoff. Inspired by several doctrines of game theory under the dynamic game scenario and the application of relevant gaming tactics, this essay argues that after the Doklam standoff, China has been consistently pursuing an India policy that is risk-averse in nature, represented by its fundamental goal of persevering stability in the secondary direction of China–India border area. As a supporter of this argumentation, a diachronic investigation in terms of the evolution of China–India Relations between 2017 and 2020 was conducted, in which both countries were presumed as state actors involving in repeated gaming process with observable actions and asymmetric information sources. The investigation covers the respective actions adopted by both China and India since the Doklam standoff in 2017, along with the strategic interactions between the two sides from 2018 to 2019, till the most recent standoff in the Galwan Valley and the standoff along the Panggong Tso in 2020. The major finding of this essay is that there exists a causal-effect relationship between the expected payment structures of both sides in a gaming process and the outcome of the implementation of a certain cooperative strategy. Besides, as opponents in a gaming process, either side’s self-cognition and its evaluation on the bilateral relations will pose critical impact on its policy-making. Therefore, in the specific case of China–India border conflict, it is highly advised that China should make practical efforts to avert cognition risks of all kinds while managing its relation with India; otherwise, negative consequences may occur due to the mismatch of its strategic goals and its policy devices.