Emergent Prosocial Behavior During Dynamic Human Group Formation

For scientists, policy makers, and the general population, there is increasing interest in how humans form cooperative groups. However, how group-oriented behavior emerges during the dynamic process of group formation is still unknown. We hypothesize that humans will exhibit emergent prosocial behavior as their immediate group size increases. Using a network-embedded-dyad prisoner dilemma task, with periodic opportunities to retain or remove group members, we find subjects consistently follow a well-performing reciprocal base policy (tit-for-tat-like) across the experimental session. However, subjects’ strategies also became more forgiving and less exploitative as group size increased, with a default preference shift to cooperation. Thus, human cooperation may emerge from a desire to create and maintain larger and more cooperative groups, and multiscale strategy that considers both self-interest and group-interest.

A Cross-cultural Analysis of Two China-US Game Cases and Tobacco Control Compliance

Objectives: This paper aims at exploring the China-US relations by analyzing the communication strategies and game intentions in two case studies and the cultural roots herein. Guided by the water and game theory for intercultural communication (WGICC) and cultural analyses, this study has found that in Case 1, China and the US have established initial win-win ties because of a mutually-beneficial trade system, the US intention to gain international recognition, and the romantic expectations of each other. In Case 2, both countries have suffered great losses due to the US pursuit of reinforced national identity and revitalized conservatism which set the stage for an endless line of plots to contain China. In return, China has been practicing a tit-for-tat strategy backed up with its grand ambition to forge a community with a shared future for mankind and ready to fight against containment and suppression from both the US and its allies. This study suggests an interactive pattern of win-win cooperation based on common needs and similar interests, and loss-loss confrontation based on real and imaginary fear while manifesting that the greatest Dao is expressed in the simplest terms. The findings can shed lighton appreciating China’s efforts in such domestic campaigns as tobacco control compliance and Covid-19 prevention and its diplomatic relations with other nations.

Tit for tat: costly punishment in manifest Huntington’s disease

Objective: We aimed to investigate costly punishment in patients with HD. Background: Huntington’s disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative disease with motor, cognitive, and psychiatric symptoms. As neuropsychiatric abnormalities often precede motor symptoms, we wanted to assess whether costly punishment is part of the neuropsychological profile of patients with HD. Methods: A total of 40 non demented subjects were prospectively enrolled in this study with a between-subject design comparing manifest HD patients (n=18) to healthy controls (HC; n=22). All participants performed eight rounds of a costly punishment task, in which money was shared unevenly in 5 rounds or in a fair manner in the remaining three rounds. Participants then had to decide whether they wanted to punish the trustee. Furthermore, all participants underwent neuropsychological background tasks. Results: HD patients performed worse in the neuropsychological background tests compared to HC (all p-values<0.05). Moreover, HD patients punished more often in fair (Wald x2=5.03, p=0.025) but not in unfair rounds (Wald x2=1.63, p=0.202). Conclusions: Our results demonstrate increased costly punishment during fair conditions in HD patients. Whether this behaviour is due to a lack of recognition of social norms, an impairment in top-down inhibition, or an effect of anti-dopaminergic medication remains unclear.

Collective Strategies With a Master-Slave Mechanism Dominate in Spatial-Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

How cooperation emerges and persists in a population of selfish agents is a fundamental question in evolutionary game theory. The research shows that collective strategies with master-slave mechanism (CSMSM) defeat tit-for-tat and other well-known strategies in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma. A CSMSM identifies kin members by means of a handshaking mechanism. If the opponent is identified as non-kin, a CSMSM will always defect. Once two CSMSMs meet, they play master and slave roles. A mater defects and a slave cooperates in order to maximize the master's payoff. CSMSM outperforms non-collective strategies in spatial IPD even if there is only a small cluster of CSMSMs in the population. The existence and performance of CSMSM in spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that cooperation first appears and persists in a group of collective agents.

Caring with a Forced Smile: Emotional Labour Among Private Hospital Nurses in Sri Lanka

Emotional labour among nurses is researched extensively. However, whether nurses in market-oriented, for-profit and customer-focused healthcare contexts performed emotional labour similarly to other nurses is severely underexplored. The minimal research available on this phenomenon have focused on Western for-profit healthcare contexts. Therefore, this article explores how nurses from for-profit healthcare sector performed emotional labour in a non-Western context—Sri Lanka. Using 30 interviews with private hospital nurses, this qualitative study found that scripted and closely managed behaviour routines, being subordinate to patients and their relatives, constant exposure to service recipients’ aggression and minimal organisational support led to a significant sense of powerlessness, loss of face, emotional exhaustion and tit-for-tat exchange of emotions with patients among nurses.

Can Social Agents Efficiently Perform in Automated Negotiation?

In the last few years, we witnessed a growing body of literature about automated negotiation. Mainly, negotiating agents are either purely self-driven by maximizing their utility function or by assuming a cooperative stance by all parties involved in the negotiation. We argue that, while optimizing one’s utility function is essential, agents in a society should not ignore the opponent’s utility in the final agreement to improve the agent’s long-term perspectives in the system. This article aims to show whether it is possible to design a social agent (i.e., one that aims to optimize both sides’ utility functions) while performing efficiently in an agent society. Accordingly, we propose a social agent supported by a portfolio of strategies, a novel tit-for-tat concession mechanism, and a frequency-based opponent modeling mechanism capable of adapting its behavior according to the opponent’s behavior and the state of the negotiation. The results show that the proposed social agent not only maximizes social metrics such as the distance to the Nash bargaining point or the Kalai point but also is shown to be a pure and mixed equilibrium strategy in some realistic agent societies.

Analysis of supply chain’s resilience in crowd networks

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the supply chain's resilience in crowd networks from both static and dynamic perspectives. Design/methodology/approach This paper first defines the supply chain’s resilience, then proposes a graphical and game-theoretic framework to evaluate the resilience. Findings In this framework, an equilibrium with high resilience will be achieved after the iterated prisoner's dilemma in the supply chain. The two-stage update mechanism contributes to higher profits, higher stability and stronger risk resistance capability. The reputation-based tit-for-tat strategy in the second stage helps to realize society cooperation. Originality/value This work pays more attention to the dynamic evolution of interactions between organizations in the supply chain. It provides an important theoretical basis for future work such as how to effectively control and guide the evolution of events in the intelligence network and how to stand sudden changes and avoid collapse.