Debates over whether transnational and international legal institutions
are fair, effective, or legitimate responses to corruption of local public
officials have an important empirical dimension. We use case studies to
examine whether foreign legal institutions serve as fair, effective, and
legitimate complements to local anticorruption institutions. We refer to
this set of claims as the “institutional complementarity theory.” The first
case study centers on proceedings concerning bribes paid by subsidiaries of
Siemens AG, a German company, to obtain and retain a contract to provide
national identity cards for the Argentine government. The second case study
examines events stemming from overbilling in the construction of a
courthouse in Brazil. Analysis of these cases suggests that the
institutional complementary theory is credible. At the same time, the
findings suggest that local institutions have greater potential, and foreign
institutions have more limited potential, than the theory assumes.
Integration contracts and asset complementarity: Theory and evidence from US data
