Managerial optimism and corporate investment behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 100492
Author(s):  
Naoshi Ikeda ◽  
Kotaro Inoue ◽  
Shoji Sugitani
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ai-Chi Hsu ◽  
Hsiao-Fen Hsiao

We set out in this study to examine the relationship between managerial optimism and corporate investment, and demonstrate that firms with valuable investment opportunities tend to invest less than the optimal level; the classic problem of underinvestment. On the other hand, however, firms which do not have valuable investment opportunities often tend to invest more than the optimum level; a problem of overinvestment. We present evidence on the relationship between such investment behavior and managerial optimism. Within those firms that do not have valuable investment opportunities, overinvestment is more likely to occur amongst optimistic managers than non-optimistic managers; conversely, for those firms with valuable investment opportunities, underinvestment is less likely amongst optimistic managers than non-optimistic managers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Jin ◽  
Junli Yu

PurposeOwing to the importance of the investment behavior in China, the purpose of this paper is to find the influence of executive network and government governance on investment efficiency.Design/methodology/approachThe paper use China’s listed companies as sample to make an investment efficiency determinant model.FindingsIn this article, the authors find that larger executive network and higher government governance will lead to more corporate investment efficient. Furthermore, the informal institution – executive network, is not only an effective way to alleviate financing constraints, but also can solve underinvestment problem. While the improvement of local government governance can provide institutional protection, it will also be more conducive to restrain overinvestment behavior.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors have not explored conduction path. Especially, the authors have not examined whether information spillover effect or the release of resources constraints in executive network plays a more important role to ease investment insufficient.Originality/valueUnder the Chinese circumstance, relationship governance can not only promote companies to improve investment efficiency, but also provide an important guarantee for sustained macroeconomic growth.


1968 ◽  
Vol 76 (6) ◽  
pp. 1123-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale W. Jorgenson ◽  
Calvin D. Siebert

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kanglong Hong

Investment behavior is one of the three major financial decisions of a company. Based on this, this paper takes China's private listed enterprises from 2004 to 2017 as samples, and through literature review and empirical analysis, studies the influence of the major shareholder's investment background on the company's investment behavior. It is found that the investment background of the major shareholder is positively correlated with the cash outflow from the company. At the same time, the major shareholders with investment experience tend to choose the pyramid shareholding structure with financing advantages. After the introduction of shareholding structure, the above positive relationship has a significant change: the internal capital market brought by the pyramid shareholding structure can promote the major shareholder with investment background to find more potential investment opportunities and promote the scale of cash outflow from the company's investment, while the direct shareholding structure can inhibit the promotion effect. To sum up, the investment background provides the major shareholder with subjective motivation and ability to conduct investment, while the pyramid shareholding structure creates objective conditions for him to some extent. The research conclusion of this paper enriches the theoretical research on the high-level echelon theory and the motivation of the existing corporate investment behavior, and provides some reference significance for the investors in the capital market to judge the investment decisions of the company and identify the sustainable development and expansion ability of the company.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Longwen Zhang ◽  
Minghai Wei

Purpose Corporate investment behavior increases the uncertainty of a company’s operation and performance. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how analyst recommendations respond to corporate uncertainty caused by investment behavior and what motivates analysts to react as they do. Design/methodology/approach The authors test two motivation hypotheses: the hypothesis that analysts are currying favor with management to obtain private information and the hypothesis that analysts have conflicts of interest due to connections. Using Chinese analyst-level data from 2007 to 2015, the authors find that overall investment levels, R&D investment and M&A events are significantly positively correlated with analyst recommendations, suggesting that analysts tend to react optimistically to corporate investment behavior. Findings Analysts are only optimistic about companies with low information transparency, suggesting that analysts may be trying to curry favor with management to gain access to private information. The authors find that analysts with stronger recommendations have more private information and analysts with more private information publish more accurate earnings forecasts, which supports the hypothesis that analysts curry favor with management through optimistic recommendations to obtain more private information. This is consistent with the logic that the difficulty of earnings forecasting increases under uncertain conditions, increasing the demand for private information. The authors then group the analysts according to their underwriting connections, securities company’s proprietary connections and fund connections, and find that the positive correlation between corporate investment behavior and analyst recommendations exists only in the unconnected groups. This is evidence against the hypothesis that analysts have conflicts of interest due to their connections. Originality/value First, the authors link the optimism of analysts with the uncertainty of analysts’ information inputs to partially unpack the black box of analysts’ analyses. Second, the authors test the two hypotheses mentioned. There is a lack of comparative studies on the influence of different motivations on the behavior of analysts.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 523-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yueh-hsiang Lin ◽  
Shing-yang Hu ◽  
Ming-shen Chen

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