PurposeThe authors present the results of a survey on how Korean firms evaluate new projects and estimate their capital costs. The authors report how Korean firms’ capital budgeting practices compare to other developed countries and to best practices in the field of finance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors survey CFOs of major Korean firms on their capital budgeting practices. The authors then compare the results against the US and European firms and best practices of leading firms and financial advisors.FindingsThe authors find that the capital budgeting practices of Korean firms are as strong as or stronger than firms in developed markets. A majority of Korean firms use best practices techniques such as NPV, IRR and the CAPM for project evaluation and cost of equity estimation. Chaebol affiliation results in somewhat stronger capital budgeting practices. The authors also find that other factors, such as company size, leverage, CEO age and CEO education, impact capital budgeting practices.Originality/valueThis paper is the first article that comprehensively examines Korean firms' capital budgeting practices.
Purpose
US corporations are now sitting on an enormous stockpile of cash. Instead of investing their resources and creating jobs, the firms are holding on to excess cash. Academicians and practitioners alike have tried to fathom the reasons why companies are holding on to so much cash. Numerous studies have talked about the various motives for holding cash. Many researchers have tried to correlate excess cash holding with particular firm characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to study the correlations that exist between excess cash holding and some measurable managerial characteristics.
Design/methodology/approach
Four different measures of managerial horizon (MH) were constructed. The first two constructs (MH1 and MH2) are based on the CEO’s age and how long he has been the CEO of the company. The next two constructs (MH3 and MH4) are based on compensation, proportion of current compensation and proportion of future compensation. This paper tries to examine if MH has any impact on excess cash holding.
Findings
The results clearly show that the CEO age and the proportion of CEO’s compensation (current and future) do determine level of cash holding in the company. Younger CEOs hold more cash compared to older CEOs. Older CEOs hold less cash suggesting that as CEOs grow older they might be motivated by the idea of leaving a long lasting legacy. CEOs who receive more of their compensation in future payments also hold on to more cash, whereas CEOs who receive more of their compensation in current payments hold less cash.
Originality/value
There is no previous literature dealing with MH and cash holding by corporations.
