Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011. With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives. This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves. With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation. All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging. The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior. The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011. With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives. This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves. With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation. All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging. The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior. The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

Pengaruh Umur CEO, Struktur Dewan Komisaris, Frekuensi Rapat Komite Audit, Konsentrasi Kepemilikan, dan Tenur Audit terhadap Volatilitas Idiosinkratik

Idiosyncratic volatility is a series of sharp increase or decreas in stock prices due to a company's fundamental. This study argues that transparent financial reports should reduce idiosyncratic volatility. Transparent financial reports are the function of CEO age, board of commissioner size, board of commissioner meetings frequency, Audit Committee meetings frequency, ownership concentration, and audit tenure. Therefore, this study examines the effect of these variables on idiosyncratic volatility. Samples were gathered from Indonesian public firms for the periode of 2014-2018. Using regression analysis for the test of hypothesis, results show that while board of commissioner meetings frequency and audit tenure have negative effects on idiosyncratic volatility, the size of the board of commissioners, concentration of ownership have positive effects on idiosyncratic volatility. On the contrary, CEO age and audit committee meetings frequency have no effects on idiosyncratic volatility.

CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms

The question of why some firms grow faster than others is of high theoretical and practical importance. Beyond a wealth of studies based on stochastic models, firm growth has mostly been explained by looking at the structural characteristics of firms, sectors, and countries. The role of managers’ characteristics in fostering firms’ growth has been explored much less. In this study, we adopt one key characteristic of managers, the age of the chief executive officer (CEO) and examine its relationship with the firm’s organic growth. Using data from a large sample of European manufacturing firms, we find that firms managed by young CEOs grow faster in terms of sales and assets, but not in terms of profitability. These results hold with the inclusion of a large vector of firm and CEO characteristics, and a battery of robustness checks, including issues related to the time horizon and appointment of CEOs, the educational attainment of younger cohorts of managers, and endogeneity. We hypothesize that young CEOs are incentivized to boost firm growth to signal their talent in the managerial market and to secure a longer stream of future compensation benefits. To the extent that firm growth does not translate into higher profitability, this may create an agency problem, due to the divergence of this corporate strategy from shareholders’ targets. In line with this hypothesis, we find that a more concentrated ownership that allows for more effective monitoring moderates the relationship between CEO age and firm growth.

Airline Chief Executive Officer and Corporate Social Responsibility

The aim of this research is to explore the determinants of airline CSR. Stakeholder theory is the theoretical underpinning. Chief executive officers (CEOs) are the research target, which is theoretically underpinned by upper echelon theory. For data collection, this study used data from COMPUSTAT, EXECUCOMP, KLD MSCI, LinkedIn, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Standard industry classification code 4512 was employed to obtain information on airline companies. Moreover, the number of observations was 154, the number of firms was 15, and the study period was 1999–2016. CSR domains include employment, the environment, and the product. The explanatory attributes are the CEO’s age, tenure, education, share ownership, stock option, and duality. Ordinary least squares and feasible generalized least squares regression analyses were executed for hypothesis testing. Regarding the results, employment CSR was positively affected by CEO age. This study found an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and environmental CSR. Environmental CSR was also negatively influenced by stock options. Product CSR was positively associated with CEO age, whereas it was negatively associated with CEO duality.

CEO Capability and CEO Arrogance

This study aims to see the effect of the CEO Capabilities and CEO Arrogance to fraudulent financial statements indication. The study used a sample of all manufacturing companies from 2017 to 2019. In accordance with the sample selection, there are 162 manufacturing companies that meet the sample criteria. In this study using multiple linear regression test. This study uses secondary data for the 2017-2019 annual report. Based on the results that have been tested, CEO capability as a respected party (CEO Age), CEO capability as the person who knows the most about the company (CEO Tenure) and CEO arrogance as a person who has political connections (CEO Political Connection) have an influence on the indication of fraudulent financial statements. Furthermore, the hypothesis of CEO Capability in Accounting/finance knowledge (CEO Education), CEO arrogance in the form of narcissism (CEO PIC) and CEO arrogance as company founder (Founder CEO) have no influence on indications of fraudulent financial statements.