Nonprofit Governance: Are Related Board Members Bad for Nonprofits?

Following recommendations from a Congressional panel tasked with improving nonprofit governance, in 2005, the IRS began requiring nonprofit organizations to report the existence of family and business relationships among board members. We study these relationships and find they are common in U.S. nonprofits and not associated with assumed detrimental effects. Rather , we find that organizations reporting relationships between board members have less management spending, lower levels of excess cash, and better reporting quality, while receiving higher contributions. Further, using detailed disclosure information, we find that while both business and family relationships among board members are associated with less administrative spending, lower levels of excess cash, and higher contributions, family relationships are also associated with better reporting quality. Overall, our evidence supports the idea that relationships among board members do not harm nonprofit organizations.

Institutional investors and the value of excess cash holdings: empirical evidence from Pakistan

PurposeThis study examines the effects of foreign and domestic institutional investors on the value of excess cash holdings in the context of Pakistan where the institutional setting is broadly considered as non-friendly to outside shareholders due to family control.Design/methodology/approachA panel sample of 220 listed firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) was employed over the period 2007–2018. Data on institutional ownership are collected from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ Public Ownership database, while the financial data are collected from Compustat Global. The study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and firm fixed effects as the main econometric specification. Moreover, the application of models with alternative measures, high-dimensional fixed effects and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression are also conducted for robustness.FindingsRobust evidence was found that unlike domestic institutional investors, which do not influence the value of excess cash holdings, foreign institutional investors positively affect the contribution of excess cash holdings to firm value. The positive effect on excess cash holdings' value is mainly driven by foreign institutions domiciled in countries with strong governance and high investor protection. Moreover, this effect is stronger in firms that are less likely to have financial constraints.Originality/valueThis study provides novel evidence on the effect of institutional investors on the value of excess cash holdings in an emerging market like Pakistan. It also adds to the literature by revealing that the effect of different groups of institutional investors on the value of excess cash holdings is not homogenous. The authors employ a panel sample of 220 listed firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period 2007–2018. Data on institutional ownership are collected from the S&P Capital IQ Public Ownership database, while the financial data are collected from Compustat Global. The study uses OLS regression with year and firm fixed effects as the main econometric specification. Moreover, the application of models with alternative measures, high-dimensional fixed effects, and 2SLS regression are also conducted for robustness.

The impact of relative CEO compensation on not-for-profit contributions

PurposeThe authors extend research suggesting that external funders reduce their contributions to not-for-profit (NFP) organizations in response to media-reported CEO compensation levels.Design/methodology/approachEmploying a maximum archival sample of 44,807 observations from US Form 990s, the authors comprehensively assess the extent that high relative NFP CEO compensation is associated with decreases in future contributions.FindingsThe authors find that donors and grantors react negatively to high relative CEO compensation but do not react adversely to high absolute executive compensation. Contributors seem to take issue with CEO compensation when they perceive it absorbs a relatively large portion of the organizations’ total expenses, which may hinder the NFP’s mission. Additional findings suggest that excess cash held by the NFP significantly exacerbates the negative baseline relationship between future contributions and high relative CEO compensation. Finally, both individual donors and professional grantors are sensitive to cash NFP CEO compensation levels, but grantors are more sensitive to CEO noncash compensation.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors’ data are focused on larger NFP organizations, so this limits the generalizability of the study. Furthermore, survivorship bias potentially influences their time-series investigations because a current year large-scale decrease in funding due to high relative CEO compensation may cause some NFP firms to drop out of the sample the following year due to significant funding reductions.Originality/valueThe study makes three noteworthy contributions to the literature. First, the study documents that the negative association between high relative CEO compensation levels and future donor and grantor contributions is much more widespread than previous literature suggested. Second, the authors document that high relative CEO compensation levels that trigger reductions in future contributions are significantly exacerbated by excess cash held by the NFP. Finally, the authors find that more sophisticated grantors are more sensitive to noncash CEO compensation levels as compared with donors.

Excess cash holding, likuiditas, dan nilai perusahaan: Studi pada perusahaan non-finansial Indonesia

This study aims to investigate the effect of excess cash on liquidity and firm value. The sample that is used is 211 non-financial firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with period from 2007 to 2017, resulting a total of 2321 firm-year observations. The regression model used are fixed effect and random effect model. The results show that excess cash increase trading continuity and decrease liquidity risk. This result can be caused by uninformed trader trading participation. Additionally, excess cash has a positive effect on firm value directly because with excess cash firm can invest. The study also finds that the effect of excess cash on illiquid firm value is negative, this result happened because excess cash can increase firm’s information asymmetry problem. Finally, we also find that excess cash has higher effect on small size firms with financial constraint problems and higher growth opportunities.

Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries

The present study empirically investigates the effect of corporate governance on the value of cash holding, usage of excess cash, and firm performance in concentrated and competitive industries in the context of less developed countries. The empirical analysis was conducted in the panel data setting using Pakistan as a case study. Our findings suggest a strong relationship between the value of cash holding and corporate governance, and the complementary effect of product market competition for corporate governance. This suggests that the external market discipline is also needed, in addition to good governance, to resolve agency problems in less developed countries. This is because less developed countries are usually characterized by lower competition, poor mechanisms for shareholder protection, and weak legal systems. Consequently, agency problems are greater in less developed countries compared to developed countries. Our findings also indicate that firms with good governance dissipate less excess cash on internal investment, dividends and diversification in competitive industries. Moreover, the significant positive relationship between the lagged excess cash and corporate governance dummy interaction with the dividend supports the dividend outcome model, particularly in the concentrated industries. Finally, our results suggest that the efficient utilization of excess cash, induced by good governance, leads to better corporate performance in less developed countries.