Different effects of internal and external tournament incentives on corporate financial misconduct: Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 329-341
Author(s):  
Xi Zhong ◽  
Liuyang Ren ◽  
Tiebo Song
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
John (Jianqiu) Bai ◽  
Chenguang Shang ◽  
Chi Wan ◽  
Yijia Zhao

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Megan F. Hess ◽  
Andrew M. Hess

SYNOPSIS In this study, we investigate the relation between accounting failure and innovation at multiple levels in an organization by developing and testing a model for how top executives and functional managers might change their risk preferences and their innovation investments in response to public disclosures of financial misconduct. At the firm level, we find that accounting failures reduce subsequent investments in R&D, as predicted by a threat rigidity (“play it safe”) psychological response among top executives. At the project level, accounting failures have the opposite effect, resulting in an increase in the number of exploratory projects, as predicted by a failure trap (“swing for the fences”) psychological response among functional managers. Unpacking this relation at multiple levels of analysis helps us to understand the complex ways in which financial misconduct shapes a firm's innovation activities and appreciate the far-reaching consequences of accounting failure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000183922110206
Author(s):  
Ivana Naumovska ◽  
Dovev Lavie

Research on misconduct suggests that accusations against industry peers generate negative consequences for non-accused firms (a “stigma effect”). Yet, building on research on competitive dynamics, we infer that such accusations can benefit non-accused firms that compete with these peers (a “competition effect”). To reconcile these opposing perspectives, we posit that the negative stigma effect will increase with greater product market overlap between the non-accused firm and its accused peer, up to a point, beyond which the positive competition effect will counterbalance it. We further conjecture that the competition effect will be relatively more pronounced when the market classification used by investors for assessing the market overlap is more fine-grained. Accordingly, we suggest that more sophisticated investors, who rely on more fine-grained market classifications, increase their shareholdings in non-accused firms to a greater extent than less sophisticated investors as the market overlap between the non-accused firm and the accused peer increases. Using elaborate data on products and investments, we analyze investors’ shareholdings and stock market returns of non-accused firms in the U.S. software industry following accusations of financial misconduct by their industry peers, and we find support for our predictions. Our study elucidates the interplay between stigma and competition following misconduct by industry peers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rozaidy Mahadi ◽  
Noor Kaziemah Sariman ◽  
Andy Lee Chen Hiung

There have been many financial scandals associated with religious-based non-profit organisations (RNPOs), their involvement in unethical and wrongdoing has pressured non-profit organisations, especially religious-based NPOs (RNPOs) to start adopting highly transparent and accountable financial management practices. Despite many efforts to improve the RNPOs’ service quality, their integrity has been tinted with many scandalous incidents of funds embezzlement and corruption. Poor financial accountability and lack of legal requirements are argued to be the underpinning reasons for such financial atrocities occurring. With the absence of sound financial governance and comprehensive financial regulations, it has been impaired the government’s ability to detect, prevent and correct RNPOs’ financial misconduct. To prevent financial misconduct from repeatedly occurring, having cogent financial control practices will ensure the RNPOs upholding their accountability duties to the clients they have served. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine Malaysian RNPOs financial controls practices. In doing so, various religious-based NGOs’ (i.e. Islam, Buddha, and Christian) representatives were interviewed, analysed, and appraised with Simon’s (1994) control framework. The findings indicate that the RNPOs financial control practices are mediated by the virtue of the religions that they have adopted, the RNPOs’ affiliation (i.e. local-based, foreign-based, and/or semi-government organisation), and the level of sponsorships and grants they have received.


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