scholarly journals Institutional investors and post-ICO performance: an empirical analysis of investor returns in initial coin offerings (ICOs)

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 101679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Fisch ◽  
Paul P. Momtaz
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Investor Returns ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings

scholarly journals Social Impact Bonds and Institutional Investors: An Empirical Analysis of a Complicated Relationship

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Del Giudice ◽  
Milena Migliavacca
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Private Capital ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Past ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
Social Impact Bonds

Over the past 8 years, social impact bonds (SIBs) have attracted increasing attention from scholars, policy makers, and investors. Notwithstanding good intentions and policy makers’ enthusiasm, SIBs have failed to attract significant private capital. Considering the SIBs issued worldwide until December 2017, we look for the critical success factors of SIB funding by investigating both the financial and contractual characteristics of SIB contracts. We find that institutional investors are more likely to participate in an SIB funding when there are fewer agency problems.

scholarly journals Blockchain-Enabled Corporate Governance and Regulation

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Dulani Jayasuriya Daluwathumullagamage ◽  
Alexandra Sims
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Textual Analysis ◽  
Sample Period ◽  
Governance Framework ◽  
Significant Growth ◽  
Final Article ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings ◽  
Relevant Factors

There is considerable hype about blockchain in almost every industry, including finance, with significant investments globally. We conduct a systematic review of 851 records and construct a final article sample of 183 for the sample period 2012 to 2020 to identify relevant factors for blockchain adoption in corporate governance. We conduct textual and empirical analysis to develop a decentralized autonomous governance framework and link traditional corporate governance theories to blockchain adoption. Furthermore, we explore present and future use cases and implications of blockchains in corporate governance. Using our systematic review and textual analysis, we further identify gaps and common trends between prior academic and industry literature. Moreover, for our empirical analysis, we compile a unique database of blockchain investments to forecast future investments. In addition, we explore blockchain potential in corporate governance during and post COVID-19. We find prior academic articles to mostly focus on regulation (49 studies) and Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) (46 studies), while industry articles tend to concentrate on exchanges (10 studies) and cryptocurrencies (9 articles). A significant growth in literature is observed for 2017 and 2018. Finally, we provide behavioural, regulatory, ethical and managerial perspectives of blockchain adoption in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Why do businesses go crypto? An empirical analysis of initial coin offerings

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 64-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saman Adhami ◽  
Giancarlo Giudici ◽  
Stefano Martinazzi
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings

scholarly journals Initial coin offerings, information disclosure, and fraud

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Hornuf ◽  
Theresa Kück ◽  
Armin Schwienbacher
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Sample Average ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings

AbstractWe study the extent of fraud in initial coin offerings (ICOs), and whether information disclosure prior to the issuance predicts fraud. We document different types of fraud, and that fraudulent ICOs are on average much larger than the sample average. Issuers who disclose their code on GitHub are more likely to be targeted by phishing and hacker activities, which suggests that there are risks related to disclosing the code. Generally, we find it extremely difficult to predict fraud with the information available at the time of issuance. This calls for the need to install a third party that certifies the quality of the issuers, such as specialized platforms, or the engagement of institutional investors and venture capital funds that can perform a due diligence and thus verify the quality of the project.

scholarly journals Corporate governance in Italy after the 1998 reform: What role for institutional investors?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Bianchi ◽  
Luca Enriques
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Investor Activism

his paper tries to answer two questions: first, whether the changes in the law resulting from the 1998 reform are able to positively affect the attitude to activism of institutional investors in Italy; and second, whether, legal rules aside, it is reasonable to expect significant institutional investor activism in Italy. We provide both an empirical analysis of the factors affecting institutional investor activism in Italy and a legal analysis of the most relevant changes in the Italian mutual funds and corporate laws, following the 1998 reform. The empirical analysis shows that institutional shareholdings and investment strategies are compatible with the hypothesis that institutional investors can play a significant role in the corporate governance of Italian listed companies. However, a curb to their playing such an active role may derive from the predominance of mutual fund management companies belonging to banking groups (giving rise to conflicts of interest) and from the prevailing ownership structure of listed companies, which are still dominated by controlling shareholders holding stakes higher than, or close to, the majority of the capital (implying a weaker bargaining power of institutions vis-à-vis controllers). The analysis of the legal changes prompted by the 1998 financial markets and corporate law reform indicates that the legal environment is now definitely more favorable to institutional investor activism than before. However, the Italian legal environment proves still to be little favorable to institutional investor activism, when compared to that of the U.S. or the U.K.

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