scholarly journals Effects of different ways of incentivizing price forecasts on market dynamics and individual decisions in asset market experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 51-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nobuyuki Hanaki ◽  
Eizo Akiyama ◽  
Ryuichiro Ishikawa
1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedman ◽  
Thomas E. Copeland

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (47) ◽  
pp. 14557-14562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Gjerstad ◽  
David Porter ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
Abel Winn

Prior studies have shown that traders quickly converge to the price–quantity equilibrium in markets for goods that are immediately consumed, but they produce speculative price bubbles in resalable asset markets. We present a stock-flow model of durable assets in which the existing stock of assets is subject to depreciation and producers may produce additional units of the asset. In our laboratory experiments inexperienced consumers who can resell their units disregard the consumption value of the assets and compete vigorously with producers, depressing prices and production. Consumers who have first participated in experiments without resale learn to heed their consumption values and, when they are given the option to resell, trade at equilibrium prices. Reproducibility is therefore the most natural and most effective treatment for suppression of bubbles in asset market experiments.


Author(s):  
Guillaume Rocheteau ◽  
Randall D. Wright
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Daniel Friedman ◽  
Hugh M Kelley

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