Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management

2021 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 62-86
Author(s):  
Qiyuan Peng ◽  
Sirui Yin
2016 ◽  
pp. 122-135
Author(s):  
Enrique Fatas ◽  
Antonio J. Morales

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 769-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter H. Fisher ◽  
Christian Keuschnigg

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Susan P. Ravenscroft

Abstract:The current study is designed to propose and test a model about the ethical reputation of a target manager who must decide whether to engage in earnings management. We employ an experimental approach to examine the potential negative reputation effects within the internal labor market of a firm that occur as a consequence of earnings management. We examine participants’ responses to a hypothetical (target) manager when both the target’s behavior and the corporate incentives were manipulated. Participants assessed how ethical they believed a target manager to be, based on the target’s decision regarding earnings management and the nature of the corporate incentives. Participants also assessed the target’s managerial ability. Participants’ judgments regarding the target’s morality were significantly affected by the target’s behavior, but were not affected by the incentive structure. Ability judgments were significantly and positively related with morality assessments. Further analysis indicates that morality assessments mediate the relationships between the target’s behavior and the participants’ willingness to extend work-related opportunities to the target. Implications of these results for management control systems design and for future research are discussed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (11) ◽  
pp. 3288-3319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Bursztyn ◽  
Thomas Fujiwara ◽  
Amanda Pallais

Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers. (JEL C93, D82, J12, J16, J31)


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter H. Fisher ◽  
Christian Keuschnigg

Author(s):  
Dionissi Aliprantis ◽  
Timothy Dunne ◽  
Kyle Fee

Workers with more education typically earn more than those with less education, and the difference has been growing in recent decades. Not surprisingly, the percentage of the population going after and getting a college degree has been rising as well. Since the late 1970s, though, the increase in college attainment has stalled for men and gathered steam for women. Among college-age individuals, more women now graduate than men. Changes in labor market incentives appear to explain the increased investment in education made by women. But men’s investments in education have been much less responsive to the same incentives.


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