A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-304
Author(s):  
Haixiang Yao ◽  
Jianxin Yi
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences

On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Domain Restrictions ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this paper we give a full characterization of Nash implementability of social choice correspondences (SCCs) in allotment economies on preference domains with private values and different types of indifference. We focus on single-peaked/single-plateaued preferences with worst indifferent allocations, single-troughed preferences and single-troughed preferences with best indifferent allocations. We begin by introducing a weak variant of no-veto power, called

A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-542
Author(s):  
Bertrand Tchantcho ◽  
Lawrence Diffo Lambo
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences

Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selçuk Özyurt ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences ◽  
Strategy Proof

Bargaining in Legislatures

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1206 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron ◽  
John A. Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Free Model ◽  
Sequential Nature ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Formal Rules

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial

1985 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Denicolò
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences
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