Degemination in Emirati Pidgin Arabic: A Sociolinguistic Perspective

This study examines the production of geminates in Emirati Pidgin Arabic (EPA) spoken by blue-collar workers in the United Arab Emirates. A simple naming test was designed to test the production of geminates to determine whether the EPA speakers would produce a geminated or degeminated phoneme. Following that, a semi-structured interview was conducted with a subset of the study cohort to obtain the participants’ own explanation of where they degeminated the consonants. Our findings suggest that the exercising of this choice functions as a sociolinguistic strategy, akin to the one observed by Labov in his study of Martha’s Vineyard. In particular, our findings show that speakers of EPA are inclined to degeminate consonantal geminates to establish themselves as members of a particular social group. The reasons for wanting to achieve this aim were given as follows: to claim privileges only available to members of this group (such as employment); and to distinguish themselves from the dominant cultural group. The study concludes that degemination in EPA has developed into a sociolinguistic solidarity marker.

On Rational Choice and the Representation of Decision Problems

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives—modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by the outside world in a structured way. Online search results are lists of items, wine menus are often lists of lists (grouped by type or country), and online shopping often involves filtering items which can be viewed as navigating a tree. Representations constrain how an agent can choose. At the same time, an agent can also leverage representations when choosing, simplifying their choice process. For instance, in the case of a list he or she can use the order in which alternatives are represented to make their choice. In this paper, we model representations and decision procedures operating on them. We show that choice procedures are related to classical choice functions by a canonical mapping. Using this mapping, we can ask whether properties of choice functions can be lifted onto the choice procedures which induce them. We focus on the obvious benchmark: rational choice. We fully characterize choice procedures which can be rationalized by a strict preference relation for general representations including lists, list of lists, trees and others. Our framework can thereby be used as the basis for new tests of rational behavior. Classical choice theory operates on very limited information, typically budgets or menus and final choices. This is in stark contrast to the vast amount of data that specifically web companies collect about their users’ choice process. Our framework offers a way to integrate such data into economic choice models.

Functional Form of Nonmanipulable Social Choice Functions with Two Alternatives

We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions on a universal domain and an arbitrary, possibly infinite, set of agents. In order to achieve this, we considered the more general case of two-valued social choice functions and describe the structure of the family consisting of groups of agents having no power to determine the values of a nonmanipulable social choice function. With the help of such a structure, we introduce a class of functions that we call powerless revealing social choice functions and show that the binary nonmanipulable social choice functions are the powerless revealing ones.

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

Graph rewriting rules for RDF database evolution: optimizing side-effect processing

Purpose Graph rewriting concerns the technique of transforming a graph; it is thus natural to conceive its application in the evolution of graph databases. This paper aims to propose a two-step framework where rewriting rules formalize instance or schema changes, ensuring graph’s consistency with respect to constraints, and updates are managed by ensuring rule applicability through the generation of side effects: new updates which guarantee that rule application conditions hold. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes Schema Evolution Through UPdates, optimized version (SetUpOPT), a theoretical and applied framework for the management of resource description framework (RDF)/S database evolution on the basis of graph rewriting rules. The framework is an improvement of SetUp which avoids the computation of superfluous side effects and proposes, via SetUpoptND, a flexible and extensible package of solutions to deal with non-determinism. Findings This paper shows graph rewriting into a practical and useful application which ensures consistent evolution of RDF databases. It introduces an optimised approach for dealing with side effects and a flexible and customizable way of dealing with non-determinism. Experimental evaluation of SetUpoptND demonstrates the importance of the proposed optimisations as they significantly reduce side-effect generation and limit data degradation. Originality/value SetUp originality lies in the use of graph rewriting techniques under the closed world assumption to set an updating system which preserves database consistency. Efficiency is ensured by avoiding the generation of superfluous side effects. Flexibility is guaranteed by offering different solutions for non-determinism and allowing the integration of customized choice functions.

On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules

In this paper we introduce the plurality kth social choice function selecting an alternative, which is ranked kth in the social ranking following the number of top positions of alternatives in the individual ranking of voters. As special case the plurality 1st is the same as the well-known plurality rule. Concerning individual manipulability, we show that the larger k the more preference profiles are individually manipulable. We also provide maximal non-manipulable domains for the plurality kth rules. These results imply analogous statements on the single non-transferable vote rule. We propose a decomposition of social choice functions based on plurality kth rules, which we apply for determining non-manipulable subdomains for arbitrary social choice functions. We further show that with the exception of the plurality rule all other plurality kth rules are group manipulable, i.e. coordinated misrepresentation of individual rankings are beneficial for each group member, with an appropriately selected tie-breaking rule on the set of all profiles.