Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 153-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyohei Marutani
Keyword(s):  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Message Spaces

scholarly journals The informational size of message spaces

1974 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Mount ◽  
Stanley Reiter
Keyword(s):  
Message Spaces

scholarly journals The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (12) ◽  
pp. 3635-3689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Nikhil Agarwal ◽  
Parag A. Pathak
Keyword(s):  
High School ◽  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Education Reform ◽  
York City ◽  
Popular Education ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
School Assignment

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)

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