A note on optimal price, warranty length and production rate for free replacement policy in static demand markets

Omega ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (6) ◽  
pp. 805-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sina Faridimehr ◽  
Seyed Taghi Akhavan Niaki
Keyword(s):  
Production Rate ◽  
Replacement Policy ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Free Replacement ◽  
Warranty Length

Optimal price, warranty length and production rate for the dynamic sales market

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-773
Author(s):  
Chao-Yu Chou ◽  
Chin-Chun Wu ◽  
Jui-Chang Cheng ◽  
Yu-Chang Lin
Keyword(s):  
Production Rate ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Warranty Length

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of After-Sales Service in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Warranty Sensitive Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yuqing Qi ◽  
Jing Wu ◽  
Tiandongjie Zhao ◽  
Yuling Sun ◽  
Bin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Margin ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Service Contract ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Free Replacement ◽  
Warranty Length

After-sales service contract is widely popular in business. Although both the cases of manufacturer offering warranty and retailer offering warranty are common in market, the differences between them have been few studied. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer or retailer offers a free-replacement warranty to the customers. Customer’s demand is affected by the warranty length. We investigate the game relationships between the supply chain members. We find that the warranty length negatively relates to the product quality in both the manufacturer offering warranty case and the retailer offering warranty case. When retailer’s profit margin is not low, the retailer offers a longer warranty than the manufacturer and vice versa. Profit of the supply chain is also analyzed along with a numerical study.

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