Vote trading and subset sums

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Bervoets ◽  
Vincent Merlin ◽  
Gerhard J. Woeginger
Keyword(s):  
Subset Sums ◽  
Vote Trading

scholarly journals Counting polynomial subset sums

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiyou Li ◽  
Daqing Wan
Keyword(s):  
Subset Sums ◽  
Counting Polynomial

Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Koehler
Keyword(s):  
Voting Paradox ◽  
Vote Trading

scholarly journals On representation of r-th powers by subset sums

1989 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Lipkin
Keyword(s):  
Subset Sums

Vote trading and Pareto efficiency

Public Choice ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Vote Trading

Subset sums over Galois rings

2019 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 148-169
Author(s):  
Yuchen Ding ◽  
Haiyan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Galois Rings ◽  
Subset Sums

scholarly journals Subset sums in abelian groups

2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 1269-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Balandraud ◽  
Benjamin Girard ◽  
Simon Griffiths ◽  
Yahya ould Hamidoune
Keyword(s):  
Abelian Groups ◽  
Subset Sums

scholarly journals Effect of holding office on the behavior of politicians

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (48) ◽  
pp. 13690-13695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Enemark ◽  
Clark C. Gibson ◽  
Mathew D. McCubbins ◽  
Brigitte Seim
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Experimental Designs ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Previous Election ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Recruitment And Selection ◽  
Behavioral Games ◽  
Norm Of Reciprocity

Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges—whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth—require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians’ behavior.

Intense Preferences, Strong Beliefs and Democratic Decision-Making

1988 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jones
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Group Activity ◽  
Pressure Group ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
The Way

Some decisions require individuals to make judgements rather than to express preferences. Some conflicts of preference arise from different beliefs about the efficacy or propriety of a policy rather than from different wants. Should the ‘intensity’ with which a judgement is made, or a belief is held, figure in decisionmaking in the way that it should ideally influence decisions concerning wants? This article questions the relevance of intensity to matters of judgement and examines how far decision processes that are sensitive to different intensities of preference, such as pressure group activity, vote trading and point voting, are open to criticism for failing to discriminate between intense wants and strong beliefs.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document